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Joint Ventures of Nonprofits and For-Profits 
by 
Terri Lynn Helge 
 
I. Introduction.1  This article 
summarizes special tax considerations that 
should be taken into account when for-profit 
parties seek to engage in joint ventures with 
charitable organizations.  In particular, there 
are two areas of concern unique to charitable 
organizations with respect to joint ventures 
with for-profit parties.  First, certain rules 
restrict or prohibit a charitable 
organization’s ability to enter into 
transactions with its insiders.  Second, a 
charitable organization’s participation in a 
joint venture with a taxable party may cause 
the charitable organization to incur unrelated 
business taxable income or lose its tax-
exempt status.  Underlying both of these 
areas of concern is the overriding concern 
that a charitable organization be organized 
primarily for the conduct of its charitable 
purposes and not engage in any activity that 
results in private inurement or private 
benefit. 
 
A. Private Inurement.  Section 501(c)(3) 
of the Code2  provides that no part of the net 
earnings of an organization described 
therein may inure to the benefit of any 
private shareholder or individual.  The 
Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) takes the 
position that any element of private 
inurement can cause an organization to lose 
or be deprived of tax exemption, and that 
there is no de minimis exception.3   The 
                                                 
1  As required by United States Treasury 
Regulations, this article is not intended or written 
to be used, and cannot be used, by any person for 
the purpose of avoiding penalties that may be 
imposed under the United States federal tax 
laws. 
2  All references to the “Code” are to the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986, as amended. 
3  Gen. Couns. Mem. 35855 (June 17, 1974).  
The U.S. Tax Court has also adopted this 
approach.  McGahen v. Comm’r, 76 T.C. 468, 
482 (1981), aff'd, 720 F.2d 664 (3d Cir. 1983); 
Unitary Mission Church of Long Island v. 
Comm’r, 74 T.C. 507 (1980), aff'd, 647 F.2d 163 
(2d Cir. 1981). 
private inurement prohibition contemplates a 
transaction between a charitable 
organization and an individual in the nature 
of an “insider,” who is able to cause 
application of the organization’s assets for 
private purposes because of his or her 
position.4   In general, an organization’s 
directors, officers, members, founders and 
substantial contributors are insiders.  The 
meaning of the term “net earnings” in the 
private inurement context has been largely 
framed by the courts.  Most decisions reflect 
a pragmatic approach, rather than a literal 
construction of the phrase “net earnings.”5  
Common transactions that may involve 
private inurement include (i) excessive 
compensation for services; (ii) inflated or 
unreasonable rental prices; (iii) certain loan 
arrangements involving the assets of a 
charitable organization; (iv) purchases of 
assets for more than fair market value; and 
(v) certain joint ventures with commercial 
entities.   
 
                                                 
4  See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(a)-1(c); see, e.g, South 
Health Ass’n v. Comm’r, 71 T.C. 158, 188 
(1978) (stating that the private inurement 
prohibition has generally been applied to an 
organization’s founders or those in control of the 
organization). 
5  See, e.g., Texas Trade Sch. v. Comm’r, 30 T.C. 
642 (1958) (holding that net earnings inured to 
insiders’ benefit when the insiders leased 
property to an organization and caused it to make 
expensive improvements that would remain after 
the lease expired); Rev. Rul. 67-4, 1967-1 C.B. 
123 (holding that an organization did not qualify 
for tax exemption because private inurement 
occurred when (i) the organization’s principal 
asset was stock in the insiders’ family-owned 
corporation, and (ii) the organization’s trustees 
failed to vote against the corporation’s issuance 
of a new class of preferred stock, diluting the 
organization’s holdings); Tech. Adv. Mem. 
9130002 (Mar. 19, 1991) (concluding that 
private inurement occurred when a hospital sold 
a facility to a private entity controlled by insiders 
for less than the fair market value). 
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B. Private Benefit.  A charitable 
organization may not confer a “private 
benefit” on persons who are not within the 
charitable class of persons who are intended 
to benefit from the organization’s 
operations, unless the private benefit is 
purely incidental.  The purpose of the 
private benefit limitation is to ensure that 
charitable organizations are operated for 
public purposes because of their special tax 
status.6  The determination of whether the 
private benefit is more than incidental is 
based on a “balancing test” set forth in a 
1987 General Counsel Memorandum: 
A private benefit is considered 
incidental only if it is incidental in 
both a qualitative and a quantitative 
sense. In order to be incidental in a 
qualitative sense, the benefit must 
be a necessary concomitant of the 
activity which benefits the public at 
large, i.e., the activity can be 
accomplished only by benefiting 
certain private individuals. To be 
incidental in a quantitative sense, 
the private benefit must not be 
substantial after considering the 
overall public benefit conferred by 
the activity.7 
If an organization provides more than 
incidental private benefit, the organization’s 
tax-exempt status may be revoked.8 
                                                 
6  See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii). 
According to the Treasury Regulations, an 
organization does not qualify for exemption 
unless it serves a public rather than a 
private interest. Thus . . . it is necessary 
for an organization to establish that it is 
not organized or operated for the benefit 
of private interests such as designated 
individuals, the creator or his family, 
shareholders of the organization, or 
persons controlled, directly or 
indirectly, by such private interests. 
Id. 
7 I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,598 (Jan. 23, 
1987) (citations omitted).  The Internal Revenue 
Service’s balancing test was adopted by the Tax 
Court in American Campaign Academy v. 
Commissioner, 92 T.C. 1053 (1989).  
8  For example, the Internal Revenue Service 
ruled that an organization formed to promote 
 The “private benefit doctrine” 
subsumes, and is technically distinct from, 
the private inurement doctrine, and is not 
limited to situations where benefits accrue to 
an organization’s insiders.9  The IRS has 
been more willing to accept the contention 
that incidental private benefit, as opposed to 
incidental private inurement, will not 
preclude or defeat tax exemption.10 
 
II. Joint Ventures with Insiders. 
 
A. Private Foundations. In general, a 
“private foundation” is a charitable 
organization that is funded by contributions 
from only a few sources (usually a single 
family or company) and that typically 
accomplishes its charitable purposes by 
making grants to other charitable 
organizations.  Section 4941 of the Code 
imposes a tax on “disqualified persons” who 
participate in acts of self-dealing with a 
private foundation.  In particular, Section 
4941 of the Code prohibits direct or indirect 
acts of “self dealing” between a private 
foundation and those individuals or entities 
who are “disqualified persons” with respect 
to the foundation.  For this purpose, the term 
“disqualified person” includes: 
(1) a substantial contributor (one 
who contributes more than 
$5,000 to the foundation, if such 
contribution is more than 2% of 
the total contributions received 
before the end of the 
foundation’s taxable year); 
(2) a foundation manager; 
(3) the owner of more than 20% of a 
business or trust which is a 
substantial contributor; 
                                                                   
interest in classical music was not exempt 
because its only method of achieving its goal 
was to support a commercial radio station that 
was in financial difficulty. Rev. Rul. 76-206, 
1976-1 C.B. 154. 
9 See Gen. Couns. Mem. 39876 (Aug. 10, 1992).  
10  See, e.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200044039 (Nov. 6, 
2000) (ruling that a contract would not defeat an 
organization’s tax-exempt status because it 
resulted in no private inurement and no more 
than incidental private benefit). 
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(4) a member of the family of any of 
the preceding; 
(5) a corporation, trust, estate, or 
partnership more than 35% of 
which is owned or held by any of 
the preceding; or 
(6) a government official.11 
A “foundation manager” includes officers 
and directors of a private foundation and any 
employee who has the authority or 
responsibility with respect to an act that 
constitutes self-dealing.12  A person is 
considered a “member of the family” if such 
person is the spouse, ancestor, child, 
grandchild or great grandchild of the 
individual who is a disqualified person.13 
 The prohibited acts of self-dealing, 
direct or indirect, between a disqualified 
person and a private foundation include the 
following: 
(1) The sale, exchange or lease 
(other than a rent-free lease to a 
private foundation) of property 
between a private foundation and 
a disqualified person. 
(2) The lending of money or other 
extension of credit between a 
private foundation and a 
disqualified person.  An interest-
free loan by a disqualified person 
to a private foundation is 
excepted from this prohibition, 
provided that the loan proceeds 
are used exclusively for exempt 
purposes. 
(3) The furnishing of goods, services 
or facilities between a private 
foundation and a disqualified 
person (other than those 
furnished by a disqualified 
person to a private foundation 
without charge and for use 
exclusively for exempt 
purposes). 
(4) The payment of compensation to 
a disqualified person for services 
                                                 
11  I.R.C. § 4946(a)(1).  The term “government 
official” is defined in Code Section 4946(c). 
12  I.R.C. § 4946(b).  
13  I.R.C. § 4946(d). 
unrelated to carrying out the 
foundation’ s exempt purposes 
and the payment of excessive 
compensation (or payment or 
reimbursement of excessive 
expenses) by a private foundation 
to a disqualified person, except a 
government official, to whom the 
payment of compensation is even 
more severely proscribed. 
(5) The transfer to or use by a 
disqualified person of the income 
or assets of a private foundation. 
(6) The agreement by a private 
foundation to make any payment 
of money or other property to a 
government official, other than 
an agreement to employ such 
official for a period after 
termination from government 
employment and certain other 
limited types of payments.14 
In considering whether a transaction 
between a private foundation and a 
disqualified person is an act of self-dealing, 
it is immaterial whether the transaction 
results in a benefit or detriment to the 
foundation.15 
 The initial tax on a disqualified person 
who participates in self-dealing is 10% of 
the amount involved.16  In addition, the 
initial excise tax on a foundation manager 
who knowingly participates in an act of self-
dealing between a disqualified person and a 
private foundation is 5% of the amount 
involved, unless such participation is not 
willful and is due to reasonable cause.17  The 
initial excise tax on foundation managers is 
capped at $20,000.18  If a disqualified person 
engages in an act of self-dealing with a 
private foundation, corrective action must be 
                                                 
14  I.R.C. § 4941(d)(1), (2). 
15  Treas. Reg. § 53.4941(d)-1(a). 
16  I.R.C. § 4941(a)(1).  The “amount involved” 
means the greater of the amount of money or fair 
market value of other property given by the 
private foundation or the amount of money or 
fair market value of other property received by 
the private foundation.  I.R.C. § 4941(e)(2). 
17  I.R.C. § 4941(a)(2). 
18  Id. 
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taken to essentially undo the act of self-
dealing to the extent possible and put the 
private foundation in a financial position not 
worse than that in which it would be if the 
disqualified person were dealing under the 
highest fiduciary standards.19  The self-
dealing excise tax is imposed each calendar 
year until the act of self-dealing is 
corrected.20 
 
B. Public Charities.  In general, a 
charitable organization is presumed to be a 
private foundation unless it can establish 
that it qualifies as a public charity under 
Sections 509(a)(1)–(3) of the Code.  Types 
of public charities described under Section 
509(a)(1) of the Code include churches, 
schools, hospitals, government entities and 
university endowment funds.21  In addition, 
an organization which normally receives 
more than one-third of its total support from 
contributions from the general public is 
considered a public charity under Section 
509(a)(1) of the Code.22  An organization 
which receives more than one-third of its 
total support from exempt function 
revenues, such as admission fees to a 
museum or patient revenues for a hospital, is 
considered a public charity under Section 
509(a)(2) of the Code, provided the 
organization does not normally receive more 
than one-third of its support from gross 
investment income.  An organization which 
does not meet either of these tests may still 
qualify as a public charity under Section 
509(a)(3) of the Code as a “supporting 
organization” of another public charity by 
virtue of the relationship between the first 
organization and the second public charity.   
 Section 4958 of the Code imposes an 
excise tax on disqualified persons who 
                                                 
19  I.R.C. § 4941(e)(3).  The Treasury 
Regulations contain specific procedures to 
correct certain acts of self-dealing between a 
private foundation and a disqualified person.  See 
Treas. Reg. § 53.4941(e)-1(c). 
20  I.R.C. § 4941(a), (e)(1). 
21  I.R.C. §§ 509(a)(1), 170(b)(1)(A)(i)-(v). 
22  I.R.C. §§ 509(a)(1), 170(b)(1)(A)(vi); Treas. 
Reg. § 1.170A-9(e)(2). 
engage in excess benefit transactions with 
public charities.  An “excess benefit 
transaction” is any transaction in which an 
economic benefit is provided by the public 
charity directly or indirectly to or for the use 
of any disqualified person, if the value of the 
economic benefit provided exceeds the 
value of the consideration (including the 
performance of services) received in 
exchange for such benefit.23  The term 
“transaction” is used very generally and 
includes a disqualified person’s use of a 
charitable organization’s property and 
services provided to a disqualified person 
without adequate payment.  Prototypical 
examples of excess benefit transactions 
include paying excessive compensation to a 
director or officer or overpaying a director 
or officer for property the director or officer 
sells to the charitable organization.  
However, any direct or indirect benefit to a 
disqualified person may result in a violation 
of Section 4958 if the disqualified person 
does not provide adequate consideration for 
the benefit. 
 The term “disqualified person” 
includes any person who was, at any time 
during the 5-year period ending on the date 
of the transaction, in a position to exercise 
substantial influence over the affairs of the 
organization.24  Some persons, including 
(but not limited to) board members, the 
president or chief executive officer, the 
treasurer or chief financial officer, family 
members of such individuals, and entities in 
which such individuals own 35% of the 
interests, are automatically considered 
“disqualified.”25  Where a person is not 
automatically disqualified, all of the facts 
and circumstances will generally be 
considered to determine if the person has 
substantial influence over the affairs of the 
organization.26  Being a substantial 
contributor to the organization is a fact 
tending to show that the person has 
                                                 
23  I.R.C. § 4958(c)(1). 
24  I.R.C. § 4958(f)(1). 
25 Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-3(c).  
26  Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-3(e). 
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substantial influence and is therefore 
disqualified.27 
 When it applies, Section 4958 imposes 
an initial tax equal to 25% of the excess 
benefit on any disqualified person. 28 A tax 
of 10% of the excess benefit is imposed on 
any organization manager, i.e., any officer, 
director, or trustee of the organization, who 
knowingly participates in the transaction.29  
The initial excise tax on organization 
managers is capped at $20,000.30  If a 
disqualified person engages in an excess 
benefit transaction with a public charity, 
corrective action must be taken to essentially 
undo the excess benefit to the extent 
possible and to take any additional measures 
to put the public charity in a financial 
position not worse than that in which it 
would be if the disqualified person were 
dealing under the highest fiduciary 
standards.31 
 The Treasury regulations provide for a 
procedure, which if followed, creates a 
rebuttable presumption that a transaction 
between a public charity and a disqualified 
person will not constitute an excess benefit 
transaction within the meaning of Section 
4958 of the Code.  These procedures apply 
to fixed payments and, with minor 
additional requirements, to non-fixed 
payments subject to a cap.32  Legislative 
history indicates that compensation 
arrangement or other financial transactions 
will be presumed to be reasonable if the 
transaction arrangement was approved in 
advance by an independent board (or an 
independent committee of the board) that (1) 
was composed entirely of individuals 
unrelated to and not subject to the control of 
the disqualified person, (2) obtained and 
                                                 
27  Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-3(e)(2). 
28  I.R.C. § 4958(f)(1). 
29  I.R.C. § 4958(a)(2).  
30  I.R.C. § 4958 (d)(2). 
31  I.R.C. § 4958(f)(6).  The Treasury 
Regulations contain specific procedures to 
correct certain excess benefit transactions 
between a public charity and a disqualified 
person.  See Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-7. 
32  Non-fixed payments to a disqualified person 
not subject to a cap are generally not advisable. 
relied upon appropriate data as to 
comparability, and (3) adequately 
documented the basis for its determination.33  
The Treasury Regulations read into the 
legislative history three distinct 
requirements: (1) approval by an authorized 
body, (2) the appropriate data as to 
comparability, and (3) the documentation.34 
 
1. Approval by an Authorized Body.  The 
authorized body may be the Board of 
Directors or a committee duly authorized 
under state law to act on behalf of the Board 
of Directors.35  A person is not considered 
part of the authorized body if he merely 
meets to provide information to the board 
and then recuses himself.36  No person 
voting on the matter may have a conflict of 
interest with respect to the transaction.37  A 
member of the authorized body does not 
have a conflict of interest if the member: 
i. is not the disqualified person or 
related to any disqualified person 
who benefits from the transaction; 
ii. is not employed by or controlled 
by any disqualified person 
benefiting from the transaction; 
iii. is not receiving compensation or 
other payments from a 
disqualified person benefiting 
from the transaction; 
iv. has no material financial interest 
affected by the compensation 
arrangement or transaction; and 
v. does not approve a transaction 
providing economic benefits to 
any disqualified person 
participating in the compensation 
arrangement or transaction, who 
in turn has approved or will 
approve a transaction providing 
economic benefits to the 
member.38 
 
                                                 
33  H.R. Rep. No. 104-506, at 56-57. 
34  Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(a)(1)-(3). 
35  Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(c)(1)(i)(A)-(C). 
36  Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(c)(1)(ii). 
37  Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(a)(1). 
38  Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(c)(1)(iii)(A)-(E). 
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2. Appropriate Data as to Comparability.  
The authorized body must have sufficient 
information to determine whether a 
compensation arrangement or other 
transaction will result in the payment of 
reasonable compensation or a transaction for 
fair value.  Relevant information includes, 
but is not limited to: 
i. compensation levels paid by other 
similarly-situated organizations 
(taxable or tax-exempt); 
ii. availability of similar services in 
the applicable geographic area; 
iii. independent compensation 
surveys; 
iv.  written offers from similar 
institutions competing for the 
services of the person; 
v. independent appraisals of all 
property to be transferred; or 
vi. offers for property received as 
part of an open and competitive 
bidding process.39 
 
3. Documentation.  For the decision to be 
adequately documented, the records of the 
authorized body must note: 
i. the terms of the transaction and 
the date it was approved; 
ii. the members of the authorized 
body who were present during the 
debate on the transaction or 
arrangement and those who voted 
on it; 
iii. the comparability data obtained 
and relied upon and how the data 
was obtained; 
iv. the actions taken with respect to 
consideration of the transaction by 
anyone who is otherwise a 
member of the authorized body 
but who had a conflict of interest 
with respect to the transaction; 
and 
v. the basis for any deviation from 
the range of comparable data 
obtained.40 
                                                 
39  Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(c)(2)(i). 
40  Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(c)(3)(i)(A)-(D), (ii).  
Moreover, such records must be prepared by the 
III. Joint Ventures with Third Parties.  
Participation in joint ventures affords 
charitable organizations with numerous 
opportunities, such as to (1) further their 
exempt purposes, (2) diversify their revenue 
source, and (3) obtain needed capital or 
expertise in an increasingly competitive 
economic environment.41  While these types 
of business arrangements can be highly 
profitable and truly beneficial to both the 
charitable and for-profit organizations 
involved, there is a serious risk for the 
participating charitable organization.  The 
failure of the charitable organization to 
protect its charitable assets can lead the loss 
its federal tax exemption. 
 Prior to 1982, a charitable organization 
automatically ceased to qualify as tax 
exempt under Code Section 501(c)(3) when 
it served as a general partner in a partnership 
that included private investors as limited 
partners.  The IRS’s reasoning was that the 
obligations of the charitable general partner 
to its for-profit limited partners were 
incompatible with its requirement to operate 
exclusively for charitable purposes.  The 
IRS’s per se opposition to charitable 
organizations’ involvement in joint ventures 
with for-profit investors was abandoned, 
however, in 1982, with the issuance of the 
Plumstead Theatre Society decision. 
 
A. Plumstead Theatre Society v. 
Commissioner.  In Plumstead, the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals held that a 
charitable organization’s participation as a 
general partner in a limited partnership 
involving private investors did not 
                                                                   
next meeting of the authorized body (or within 
60 days after the final action of the authorized 
body, if later than the next meeting) and must be 
reviewed and approved as reasonable, accurate 
and complete within a reasonable time period 
thereafter.  Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(c)(3)(ii). 
41  See generally Nicholas A. Mirkay, Relinquish 
Control! Why the IRS Should Change Its Stance 
on Exempt Organizations in Ancillary Joint 
Ventures, 6 NEV. L. J. 21 (2005). 
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jeopardize its tax exempt status.42  The 
theatre company at question co-produced a 
play as one of its charitable activities.  Prior 
to the opening of the play, the theatre 
company encountered financial difficulties 
in raising its share of costs.43  In order to 
meet its funding obligations, the theatre 
company formed a limited partnership in 
which it served as general partner, and two 
individuals and a for-profit corporation were 
the limited partners.  The IRS denied tax-
exempt status to the theatre company on the 
grounds that it was not operated exclusively 
for charitable purposes.  Based on the 
safeguards contained in the limited 
partnership agreement, which served to 
insulate the theatre company from potential 
conflicts with its exempt purposes, the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed with the 
IRS, holding that the theatre company was 
operated exclusively for charitable (and 
educational) purposes, and therefore was 
entitled to tax exemption.  One of the 
significant factors supporting the court’s 
holding was its finding that the limited 
partners had no control over the theatre 
company’s operations or over the 
management of the partnership.44  Another 
significant factor was that the theatre 
company was not obligated for the return of 
any capital contribution made by the limited 
partners from the theatre company’s own 
funds.45   
 Following its defeat in this landmark 
court decision, the IRS abandoned its prior 
per se opposition and formulated the basis 
on which charitable organizations could 
become general partners in joint ventures 
without violating the terms of their 
exemption. 
 
B. The IRS’s Two-Part Test for Joint 
Ventures.  Soon after Plumstead, the IRS 
issued General Counsel Memoranda 39005 
                                                 
42  Plumstead Theatre Society v. Comm’r, 675 
F.2d 244 (9th Cir. 1982) aff’g 74 T.C. 1324 
(1980). 
43  Id. 
44  Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200502046 (Oct. 18, 2004). 
45  Id. 
in which it set forth the required analysis in 
testing a charitable organization’s 
participation as a general partner in a limited 
partnership involving private investors.  The 
IRS used a two-prong “close scrutiny” test 
to determine the permissibility of joint 
venture arrangements between charitable 
and for-profit organizations.  The IRS 
reiterated that participation by a charitable 
organization as a general partner in a limited 
partnership with private investors would not 
per se endanger its tax exempt status.46  
However, close scrutiny would be necessary 
to ensure that the obligations of the 
charitable organization as general partner do 
not conflict with its ability to pursue 
exclusively charitable goals.47  
Thus, in all partnership cases, the 
initial focus should be on whether 
the joint venture organization 
furthers a charitable purpose.  
Once charitability is established, 
the partnership agreement itself 
should be examined to see 
whether the arrangement permits 
the exempt party to act 
exclusively in furtherance of the 
purposes for which exemption is 
granted, and not for the benefit of 
the limited partners.48   
The foregoing required a finding that the 
benefits received by the limited partners are 
incidental to the public purposes served by 
the partnership.49 
 In other words, the two-pronged “close 
scrutiny” test requires that: (1) the activities 
of the joint venture further the charitable 
purposes of the charitable organization; and 
(2) the structure of the venture insulate the 
charitable organization from potential 
conflicts between its charitable purposes and 
its joint venture obligations, and minimizes 
the likelihood that the arrangement will 
generate private benefit.  If the charitable 
organization fails to satisfy either test and 
the activities of the joint venture are 
                                                 
46  Gen. Couns. Mem. 39005 (June 28, 1983). 
47  Id. 
48  Id. 
49  Id. 
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substantial, the IRS may seek to revoke the 
charitable organization’s tax exemption. 
  
C. Control by the Charitable Organization 
is a Key Factor.  In evaluating joint ventures 
between charitable organizations and for-
profit organizations, the focus of the IRS in 
applying the two-pronged close scrutiny test 
eventually evolved into a “facts-and-
circumstances” determination.  This 
determination focused on whether the 
charitable organization retained sufficient 
control over the joint venture activities, 
thereby ensuring that the organization’s own 
charitable purposes were furthered or 
accomplished through its participation in the 
joint venture and no more than incidental 
benefit, financial or otherwise, was 
conferred on the for-profit participants.   
 
1. Revenue Ruling 98-15.  Revenue 
Ruling 98-15 was the first guidance with 
precedential value promulgated by the IRS 
with respect to joint ventures between 
charitable organizations and for-profit 
entities.50  The ruling incorporates the two-
part close scrutiny test set forth in General 
Counsel Memorandum 39005 with a focus 
on whether charitable organizations 
“control” the ventures in which they 
participate.51  The IRS saw the charitable 
organization’s control of the venture as 
crucial because it provided the charitable 
organization with an ability to ensure that 
the venture’s activities were exclusively in 
furtherance of the charitable organization’s 
exempt purposes and served as a safeguard 
against too much benefit, financial or 
otherwise, being conferred on the for-profit 
participants. 
 Revenue Ruling 98-15 describes two 
scenarios: one “good” and one “bad” joint 
venture involving nonprofit and for-profit 
healthcare organizations.52  The IRS 
scrutinizes a variety of factors that 
determine whether the nonprofit has 
                                                 
50  Rev. Rul. 98-15, 1998-1 C.B. 17. 
51  Id.  
52  Rev. Rul. 98-15, 1998-1 C.B. 17. 
sufficient control over the venture.53  
Although Revenue Ruling 98-15 lists a 
number of relevant factors, four factors 
appear to be most significant: (1) 
governance control of the joint venture; (2) 
control of day-to-day operations of the joint 
venture; (3) management of conflicts of 
interest between the tax-exempt and for-
profit participants; and (4) priority of 
charitable purposes over profit motives in 
the joint venture operations. 
 Based on substantial scrutiny of 
Revenue Ruling 98-15 after its release, 
several conclusions can be drawn.  First, 
charitable organizations may participate in a 
joint venture with private investors and not 
automatically jeopardize their tax-exempt 
status.  Second, in such situations, the joint 
venture agreement should clearly provide 
that the charitable partner’s charitable 
purposes supersede any financial or private 
concerns in the event of a conflict between 
those goals.  In addition, all contracts and 
agreements between the joint venture and 
another for-profit entity, such as a 
management agreement, must be entered 
into at arm’s length and reflect 
commercially reasonable terms.  Finally, 
Revenue Ruling 98-15 clearly favors the 
control of the joint venture’s governing body 
by the charitable organization and elevates 
this component to unprecedented 
importance.54  
 
2. Redlands Surgical Services v. 
Commissioner.  In Redlands, the Tax Court 
upheld the IRS’s denial of tax exempt status 
to a charitable organization which formed a 
joint venture with for-profit organizations.55  
In arriving at its decision that private, rather 
than charitable, interests were being served, 
the court examined various factors similar to 
the factors the IRS enunciated in Revenue 
Ruling 98-15.56  The court noted, most 
                                                 
53  Id. 
54  See generally Mirkay, supra note 41. 
55  Redlands Surgical Services v. Comm’r, 113 
T.C. 47 (1999), aff’d, 242 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 
2001).  
56  Id. 
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significantly, that there was a lack of any 
express or implied obligation of the for-
profit parties to place charitable objectives 
ahead of for-profit objectives.57  Moreover, 
the relevant organizational documents did 
not include an overriding charitable 
purpose.58  The Tax Court held that the 
requirement that a charitable organization 
operate exclusively for charitable purposes 
is not satisfied merely by establishing 
“whatever charitable benefits [the 
partnership] may produce,” finding that the 
charitable partner lacked “formal or 
informal control sufficient to ensure 
furtherance of charitable purposes.”59  
Affirming the Tax Court, the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals held that ceding “effective 
control” of partnership activities 
impermissibly serves private interests.60  
Redlands provides that a charitable 
organization may form partnerships, or enter 
into contracts, with private parties to further 
its charitable purposes on mutually 
beneficial terms, “so long as the charitable 
organization does not thereby impermissibly 
serve private interests.”61 
 
3. St. David’s Health Care System v. 
United States.  The issue of whether a 
charitable organization’s participation in a 
joint venture with for-profit participants 
would cause loss of the charitable 
organization’s tax exempt status was 
revisited in St. David’s, a case tried right 
here in Austin.  Relying on Revenue Ruling 
98-15 and Redlands, the Fifth Circuit Court 
of Appeals focused on the issue of the 
charitable organization’s control over the 
joint venture, ultimately concluding that 
genuine issues of material fact existed with 
respect to whether the charitable 
organization “ceded control” of its tax-
                                                 
57  Id. 
58  Id. 
59  Id. 
60  242 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001). 
61  Rev. Rul. 2004-51, 2004-1 C.B. 974 (quoting 
Redlands Surgical Services v. Comm’r, 113 T.C. 
47 (1999)) 
exempt hospital.62  The court held that the 
determination of whether a charitable 
organization that enters into a partnership 
with for-profit partners operates exclusively 
for exempt purposes is not limited to 
“whether the partnership provides some (or 
even an extensive amount of) charitable 
services.”63  The charitable partner also must 
have the “capacity to ensure that the 
partnership’s operations further charitable 
purposes.”64  Thus, “the [charity] should 
lose its tax-exempt status if it cedes control 
to the for-profit entity.”65  The Fifth Circuit 
ultimately wanted to see majority control by 
the charitable organization.  The IRS 
continues to view its position on control of 
the joint venture by the charitable 
organization, as supported by the St. David’s 
decision, as the “proper framework” for 
analyzing joint ventures between charitable 
organizations and for-profit entities.66 
 
4. Revenue Ruling 2004-51.  Revenue 
Ruling 2004-51 is the first instance in which 
the IRS acknowledges and supports equal 
ownership by charitable and for-profit 
participants in a joint venture, provided 
some protections are in place to ensure the 
furtherance of the charitable organization’s 
exempt purposes.67  The ruling pointedly 
looks at which partner controls the exempt 
activities.  If the charitable partner controls 
the exempt activities, the joint venture 
presumably will not endanger the tax 
exemption of the charitable organization.  
Specifically, Revenue Ruling 2004-51 
involved an exempt university that formed a 
limited liability company with a for-profit 
entity to provide distance learning via 
interactive video.  Ownership of the joint 
venture was split equally between the 
university and the for-profit partner, but the 
university controlled the academic portion 
                                                 
62 St. David’s Health Care System v. United 
States, 349 F.3d 232 (5th Cir. 2003). 
63  Id. at 243. 
64  Id. 
65  Id. at 239. 
66  Id. 
67  Rev. Rul. 2004-51, 2004-1 C.B. 974. 
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of the joint venture’s activities, while the 
for-profit partner provided and controlled 
production expertise.  The ruling concluded 
that the university’s exempt status was not 
affected by the joint venture because the 
activities constituted an insubstantial part of 
the university’s activities.68  The ruling also 
implies that fifty-fifty control of the joint 
venture is acceptable as long as the 
charitable partner controls the charitable 
aspects of the joint venture.69 
 Even though Revenue Ruling 2004-51 
marks an indisputable movement forward in 
the IRS’s stance regarding the proper federal 
income tax treatment of joint ventures 
between charitable organizations and for-
profit organizations, the ruling stops short of 
answering all of the questions and issues 
raised by venturers.  In particular, Revenue 
Ruling 2004-51 does not modify Revenue 
Ruling 98-15.  Therefore, the control 
requirement set forth in Revenue Ruling 98-
15 is still viewed as essential by the IRS, 
continuing to raise questions as to how and 
when it may be applied. 
 
IV. Unrelated Business Income Tax 
(“UBIT”): General Rules.70 
 
A. Definition of Unrelated Business.  
Since the 1950s, the unrelated business 
                                                 
68  Id. 
69 Id.  Revenue Ruling 2004-51 further stated 
that the limited liability company’s activities 
would not generate unrelated business income 
for the university because (1) the university had 
exclusive control over the educational content, 
(2) all contracts entered into by the limited 
liability company were at arms length and for 
fair market value, (3) allocations and 
distributions were proportional to each member’s 
ownership interest, (4) the video courses covered 
the same content as the university’s traditional 
classes, and (5) the video courses increased 
access to the university’s educational programs.  
Id. 
70 Portions of this discussion on unrelated 
business income are extracted from the author’s 
previously published article, The Taxation of 
Cause-Related Marketing, 85 CHI-KENT L. REV. 
883 (2010). 
income tax has been imposed on a charity’s 
net income from a regularly carried on trade 
or business that is unrelated to the charity’s 
tax-exempt purposes.  Often times, the 
justification for imposing this tax on a 
charity’s net income from unrelated business 
activities is that such activities involve 
unfair competition with the charity’s for-
profit counterparts.71  Organizations 
described in Section 501(c)(3) of the Code 
are generally subject to income tax on the 
net income produced from engaging in an 
unrelated trade or business activity.72  The 
term “unrelated trade or business” means an 
activity conducted by a tax-exempt 
organization which is regularly carried on73 
for the production of income from the sale 
of goods or performance of services74 and 
which is not substantially related to the 
performance of the organization’s 
charitable, educational or other exempt 
functions.75   
 
1. Activity is a “Trade or Business.”  For 
purposes of the unrelated business income 
tax regime, “the term ‘trade or business’ has 
the same meaning it has in Section 162, and 
generally includes any activity carried on for 
the production of income from the sale of 
goods or performance of services.”76  
Section 162 of the Code governs the 
deductibility of trade or business expenses.  
In that context, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
declared that “to be engaged in a trade or 
business, the taxpayer must be involved in 
                                                 
71 See Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(b) (“The primary 
objective of adoption of the unrelated business 
income tax was to eliminate a source of unfair 
competition by placing the unrelated business 
activities of certain exempt organizations upon 
the same tax basis as the nonexempt business 
endeavors with which they compete.”). 
 
72  See I.R.C. § 511. 
 
73  Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(a). 
  
74  I.R.C. § 513(c); Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(b). 
 
75  I.R.C. § 513(a). 
76  Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(b).   
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the activity with continuity and regularity 
and . . . the taxpayer’s primary purpose for 
engaging in the activity must be for income 
or profit.”77  When applying this test, the 
IRS may take into account a key purpose of 
the unrelated business income tax: to 
prevent unfair competition between taxable 
and tax-exempt entities.  “[W]here an 
activity does not possess the characteristics 
of a trade or business within the meaning of 
section 162, such as when an organization 
sends out low cost articles incidental to the 
solicitation of charitable contributions, the 
unrelated business income tax does not 
apply since the organization is not in 
competition with taxable organizations.”78   
 The most important element as to 
whether the activity is a trade or business is 
the presence of a profit motive.  In the 
context of a tax-exempt organization, the 
U.S. Supreme Court declared that the 
inquiry should be whether the activity “‘was 
entered into with the dominant hope and 
intent of realizing a profit.’”79  Significant 
weight is given to objective factors such as 
whether the activity is similar to profit-
making activities conducted by commercial 
enterprises.80 When the activity involved is 
highly profitable and involves little risk, 
courts generally infer the presence of a 
profit motive.81  The mere fact that the 
                                                 
77 Comm’r v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23, 35 
(1987). 
78 Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(b).  But see La. Credit 
Union League v. United States, 693 F.2d 525, 
542 (5th Cir. 1982) (“[T]he presence or absence 
of competition between exempt and nonexempt 
organizations does not determine whether an 
unrelated trade or business is to be taxed.”). 
79  United States v. Am. Bar Endowment, 477 
U.S. 105, 110, n. 1 (1986) (quoting Brannen v. 
Comm’r, 722 F.2d 695, 704 (11th Cir. 1984).   
80  Ill. Ass’n of Prof’l Ins. Agents v. Comm’r, 
801 F.2d 987, 992 (7th Cir. 1986). 
81  See, e.g., Carolinas Farm & Power Equip. 
Dealers Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 699 F.2d 
167, 170 (4th Cir. 1983) (“[T]here is no better 
objective measure of an organization’s motive 
for conducting an activity than the ends it 
achieves.”); La. Credit Union League v. United 
States, 693 F.2d 525, 533 (5th Cir. 1982) 
(finding that a profit motive existed based on the 
activity is conducted as a fund-raising 
activity of the charity is not sufficient to 
conclude that the activity is not a trade or 
business.82 
 
2. Regularly Carried On Requirement.  In 
general, in determining whether a trade or 
business is “regularly carried on,” one must 
consider the frequency and continuity with 
which the activities productive of income 
are conducted, and the manner in which they 
are pursued.  Business activities are deemed 
to be “‘regularly carried on’ if they manifest 
a frequency and continuity, and are pursued 
in a manner, generally similar to comparable 
commercial activities of nonexempt 
organizations.”83  For example, “[w]here 
income producing activities are of a kind 
normally conducted by nonexempt 
commercial organizations on a year-round 
basis, the conduct of such activities by an 
exempt organization over a period of only a 
few weeks does not constitute the regular 
carrying on of trade or business [sic].”84  
Similarly, “income producing or fund 
raising activities lasting only a short period 
of time will not ordinarily be treated as 
regularly carried on if they recur only 
occasionally or sporadically.”85  However, 
“[w]here income producing activities are of 
a kind normally undertaken by nonexempt 
                                                                   
fact that the organization was extensively 
involved in endorsing and administering an 
insurance program that proved highly profitable); 
Fraternal Order of Police Ill. State Troopers 
Lodge No. 41 v. Comm’r, 87 T.C. 747, 756 
(1986), aff’d, 833 F.2d 717 (7th Cir. 1987) 
(reasoning that the organization’s advertising 
activities were “obviously conducted with a 
profit motive” because the activities were highly 
lucrative and with no risk or expense to the 
organization). 
82  See Am. Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. at 115 
(stating that a charity cannot escape taxation by 
characterizing an activity as fundraising, because 
otherwise “any exempt organization could 
engage in a tax-free business by ‘giving away’ 
its product in return for a ‘contribution’ equal to 
the market value of the product”). 
83  Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(c)(1). 
84  Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(c)(2)(i).   
85  Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(c)(2)(iii).   
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commercial organizations only on a seasonal 
basis, the conduct of such activities by an 
exempt organization during a significant 
portion of the season ordinarily constitutes 
the regular conduct of trade or business.”86   
 In making this determination, it is 
essential to identify the appropriate 
nonexempt commercial counterpart to the 
exempt organization’s activity, because the 
manner in which the nonexempt commercial 
counterpart conducts its similar activities 
has an important bearing on whether the 
activity is considered to be carried on year-
round, on a seasonal basis or intermittently.  
For example, a tax-exempt organization’s 
annual Christmas card sales program was 
determined to be regularly carried on when 
conducted over several months during the 
holiday season because, although 
nonexempt organizations normally conduct 
the sale of greeting cards year-round, the 
Christmas card portion of the nonexempt 
organizations’ sales was conducted over the 
same seasonal period.87  By contrast, when 
an exempt organization’s fundraising 
activities are conducted on an intermittent 
basis, such activities are generally 
considered not to be regularly carried on.88 
                                                 
86  Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(c)(2)(i). 
87  Veterans of Foreign Wars, Dept. of Mich. v. 
Comm’r, 89 T.C. 7, 32-37 (1987).   
88  See Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(c)(2)(iii) (stating 
fundraising activities lasting only a short period 
of time will generally not be regarded as 
regularly carried on, despite their recurrence or 
their manner of conduct); Suffolk County 
Patrolmen’s Benevolent Ass’n, Inc. v. Comm’r, 
77 T.C. 1314 (1981), acq., 1984-2 C.B. 2 
(determining that the conduct of an annual 
vaudeville show one weekend per year and the 
solicitation and publication of advertising in the 
related program guide which lasted eight to 
sixteen weeks per year was intermittent and not 
regularly carried on).  Cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-
1(c)(2)(ii) (“[E]xempt organization business 
activities which are engaged in only 
discontinuously or periodically will not be 
considered regularly carried on if they are 
conducted without the competitive and 
promotional efforts typical of commercial 
endeavors.”) 
 
 Furthermore, in determining whether 
an exempt organization’s business activities 
are “regularly carried on,” the activities of 
the organization’s agents may be taken into 
account.89  Courts disagree as to whether an 
exempt organization’s preparation time in 
organizing and developing an income-
producing activity may be taken into 
account.90   
 
3. Unrelated to the Charity’s Exempt 
Purpose.   In the event the charity’s 
activities are determined to be regularly 
carried on, the next inquiry is whether such 
activities are related to the charity’s 
purposes which constitute the basis for its 
exemption.91  This in an inherently factual 
determination.  To determine whether the 
business activity is “related,” the 
relationship between the conduct of the 
business activities that generate the income 
and the accomplishment of the 
organization’s exempt purposes must be 
examined to determine whether a causal 
relationship exists.92  The activity will not be 
substantially related merely because the 
income produced from the activity is used to 
further the organization’s exempt 
purposes.93  Rather, the inquiry focuses on 
the manner in which the income is earned.  
Thus, a substantial causal relationship exists 
                                                 
89  State Police Ass’n of Mass. v. Comm’r, 72 
T.C.M. (CCH) 582 (1996), aff’d, 125 F.3d 1 (1st 
Cir. 1997).   
90  See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. 
Comm’r, 92 T.C. 456 (1989) (finding that 
NCAA’s sale of advertisements for annual 
championship program was “regularly carried 
on,” in part because of the amount of preliminary 
time spent to solicit advertisements and prepare 
them for publication), rev’d, 914 F.2d 1417 (10th 
Cir. 1990) (holding that this activity was not 
regularly carried on, because only the time spent 
conducting the activity, not the time spent in 
preparations, is relevant to that determination); 
A.O.D. 1991-015 (indicating that the IRS will 
continue to litigate the issue). 
91  See Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(1).   
 
92  Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(1). 
 
93  I.R.C. § 513(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(1). 
 -13- 
TEXAS TAX LAWYER – SPRING 2014 
if the distribution of the goods from which 
the income is derived contributes 
importantly to the accomplishment of the 
organization’s exempt purposes.94  In each 
case, the determination of whether this 
relationship exists depends on the facts and 
circumstances involved.  In making this 
determination, the size and extent of the 
activities involved are considered in relation 
to the nature and extent of the exempt 
functions they are serving.95  If the activities 
are conducted on a scale larger than is 
reasonably necessary to accomplish the 
exempt purposes, the income attributed to 
the excess activities constitutes unrelated 
business income.96 
 
B. Exceptions and Modifications.  The 
term “unrelated trade or business” is subject 
to several exceptions under which certain 
businesses that may otherwise constitute 
unrelated businesses are removed from the 
scope of the tax.  In particular, the term 
“unrelated trade or business” does not 
include a trade or business in which 
substantially all the work in carrying on the 
trade or business is performed for an 
organization without compensation.97  
Unlike the other exceptions, the “volunteer 
exception” is not restricted as to the nature 
of the businesses to which it pertains.  In 
addition, the term “unrelated trade or 
business” does not include the trade or 
business of selling merchandise, 
substantially all of which has been received 
by the organization as gifts or 
contributions.98  Finally, an exception from 
the unrelated business income tax is also 
provided for income derived from the 
distribution of low cost articles incident to 
the solicitation of charitable contributions.99 
                                                 
 
94  Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(2). 
 
95  See I.R.C. § 511. 
 
96  Id. 
97  I.R.C. § 513(a)(1). 
98  I.R.C. § 513(a)(3). 
99  I.R.C. § 513(h).  For tax years beginning in 
2012, a low-cost article is one which has a cost 
 
1. Passive Activities Generally.  The 
purpose of the unrelated business income tax 
is to eliminate the conduct of unrelated 
businesses by tax exempt organizations as a 
source of unfair competition with for-profit 
companies.  To the extent that income of a 
tax exempt organization is derived from 
investment and other passive activities, the 
taxation of such income is not necessary to 
accomplish this goal.  Accordingly, the 
modifications to the unrelated business 
income tax exclude most passive income, as 
well as the deductions associated with such 
passive income, from the scope of the tax.100  
In particular, the following types of passive 
income are excluded from unrelated 
business taxable income: 
i. dividends;101 
ii. interest;102 
iii. annuities;103 
iv. payments with respect to 
securities loans;104 
v. amounts received or accrued as 
consideration for entering into 
agreements to make loans;105 
vi. royalties;106  
                                                                   
to the organization of $9.90 or less.  Rev. Proc. 
2011-52, 2011-45 I.R.B. 
100  See generally Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden de 
Predicadores, 263 U.S. 578 (1924). 
101  I.R.C. § 512(b)(1).   
102  I.R.C. § 512(b)(1). 
103  I.R.C. § 512(b)(1). 
104  I.R.C. § 512(b)(1).  The term “payments with 
respect to securities loans,” refers to income 
derived from a securities lending transaction in 
which an exempt organization loans securities 
from its portfolio to a broker in exchange for 
collateral.  I.R.C. § 512(a)(5).  Payments derived 
from a securities lending transaction typically 
include interest earned on the collateral and 
dividends or interest paid on the loaned 
securities while in the possession of the broker. 
105  I.R.C. § 512(b)(1). 
106  I.R.C. § 512(b)(2).  A royalty is defined as a 
payment that relates to the use of a valuable 
right, such as a name, trademark, trade name or 
copyright.  Rev. Rul. 81-178, 1981-2 C.B. 135.  
By contrast, the payment for personal services 
does not constitute a royalty.  Id. 
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vii. gains or losses from the sale, 
exchange, or other disposition of 
property other than inventory;107 
and 
viii. gains or losses recognized in 
connection with a charitable 
organization’s investment 
activities from the lapse or 
termination of options to buy or 
sell securities or real property.108 
 
2. Rents.  In addition, certain rents are 
excluded from unrelated business taxable 
income.109  The exclusion applies to rents 
from real property and rents from personal 
property leased with such real property, 
provided that the rents attributable to the 
personal property are an incidental amount 
of the total rents received or accrued under 
the lease.110  Three principal exceptions limit 
the ability of a charitable organization to 
exclude the eligible rents described above 
from unrelated business taxable income.  
The exceptions apply when there are 
excessive personal property rents, when rent 
is determined by net profits from the 
property, and when certain services are 
rendered to the lessee.  Under the first 
exception, the rental exclusion does not 
apply if more than 50% of the total rent 
received or accrued under the lease is 
attributable to personal property, determined 
at the time the personal property is first 
placed in service.111  Under the second 
exception, the rental exclusion is not 
available if the determination of the amount 
of rent depends in whole or in part on the 
income or profits derived by any person 
from the leased property, other than an 
amount based on a fixed percentage or 
percentages of receipts or sales.112  Under 
the third exception, payments for the use or 
occupancy of rooms or other space where 
services are also rendered to the occupant do 
                                                 
107  I.R.C. § 512(b)(5). 
108  I.R.C. § 512(b)(5). 
109  I.R.C. § 512(b)(3). 
110  I.R.C. § 512(b)(3)(A). 
111  I.R.C. § 512(b)(3)(B)(i). 
112  I.R.C. § 512(b)(3)(B)(ii). 
not constitute rent from real property.113  As 
a general rule, services are considered to be 
rendered to the occupant if the services are  
(a) primarily for the convenience of the 
occupant, and (2) other than those usually or 
customarily rendered in connection with the 
rental of rooms or other space for occupancy 
only.114 
 
3. Royalties.  Because royalties are 
passive in nature, the receipt of royalty 
income by a tax-exempt organization does 
not result in unfair competition with taxable 
entities.115 Accordingly, section 512 of the 
Code provides that a charity’s UBTI 
generally does not include royalties.116 A 
royalty is defined as a payment that relates 
to the use of a valuable right, such as a 
name, trademark, trade name, or 
copyright.117 The royalty may be in the form 
of a fixed fee or a percentage of sales of the 
products bearing the charity’s name and 
logo. In addition, the tax-exempt 
organization may retain the right to approve 
the use of its name or logo without changing 
the determination that the income from the 
transaction is a royalty. 
 Of particular importance in the royalty 
context is the amount of services the charity 
performs in exchange for the payment 
received. In order to maintain the royalty 
exemption for the payments received, the 
charity may not perform more than de 
minimis services in connection with the 
arrangement.118 If the charity performs 
more than insubstantial services, then the 
income received is considered 
compensation for personal services, the 
royalty exception would not apply, and 
                                                 
113  Treas. Reg. § 1.512(b)-1(c)(5). 
114  Id. 
115  See Sierra Club Inc. v. Comm’r, 86 F.3d 
1526, 1533 (9th Cir. 1996). 
116  I.R.C. § 512(b)(2); Treas. Reg. § 1.512(b)-
1(b). A charity’s UBTI would include royalties 
derived from debt-financed property. Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.512(b)-1(b). 
117  Rev. Rul. 81-178, 1981-2 C.B. 135. 
118  Sierra Club, 86 F.3d at 1533–35. 
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the income would most likely be subject 
to tax as UBTI.119 
 For example, the Internal Revenue 
Service privately ruled that royalties 
received by a charity from the license of the 
charity’s intellectual property to a for-profit 
company for use in the company’s 
commercial activities were excluded from 
the charity’s UBTI under the royalty 
exception.120 Under the license agreement, 
the charity retained the right to review the 
designs and proposed uses of the charity’s 
intellectual property, inspect the commercial 
counterpart’s facilities where the product 
was manufactured, and inspect the 
commercial counterpart’s books and records 
annually. The Internal Revenue Service 
determined that these services performed by 
the charity in connection with the licensing 
arrangement were de minimis. Moreover, the 
licensing agreement was narrowly tailored 
to protect the charity’s ownership of its 
intellectual property by giving the charity 
absolute discretion to reject proposed uses of 
the property, providing notice on every unit 
displaying the charity’s mark that it was 
used with the charity’s permission, and 
allowing the charity to approve and limit 
mass media advertising of the product. The 
Internal Revenue Service concluded that the 
income that the charity would receive from 
the arrangement was “vastly out of 
proportion with the time and effort” the 
charity would expend. Therefore, it could 
only be compensation for the use of the 
charity’s intellectual property. 
 The determination of the permissible 
amount of “insubstantial services” is 
uncertain, however, especially in connection 
with the charitable organization’s exercise 
of quality control over the use of its name, 
logo, and trademarks. As is prudent business 
practice, a charity would want to maintain 
quality control over the use of its name, 
logo, and trademark by the corporate partner 
under the licensing agreement. In some 
                                                 
119  See Rev. Rul. 81-178. 
120  Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200601033 (Oct. 14, 2005). 
cases, the Internal Revenue Service has 
determined that “mere” quality control does 
not constitute more than insubstantial 
services related to the royalty income.121 In 
other cases, a charity’s “quality control” was 
recharacterized as services, resulting in the 
income from the arrangement being taxed as 
compensation from services rather than 
exempted as royalty income.122  Therefore, 
charities are left to struggle with the 
determination of the permissible types of 
“quality control” they can include in their 
licensing agreements without crossing the 
boundary between de minimis and 
substantial services. 
 Furthermore, caution should be taken in 
relying on the royalty exception for income 
received from the licensing of a charity’s 
name or logo for placement on a corporate 
sponsor’s product.  In evaluating the 
justification for the continued tax exemption 
for college athletic programs, the 
Congressional Budget Office recommended 
repealing the royalty exception to the extent 
that it applies to the licensing of a charity’s 
name or logo: 
Some types of royalty income may 
reasonably be considered more 
commercial than others. . . . [W]hen 
colleges and universities license team 
names, mottoes, and other trademarks 
to for-profit businesses that supply 
apparel, accessories, and credit cards to 
the general public, they approve each 
product and use of their symbols and, 
in some cases, exchange information, 
such as donor lists, with the licensees 
to aid in their marketing. . . . The 
manufacture or sale of such items 
would clearly be commercial—and 
subject to the UBIT—if undertaken 
directly by the schools. Schools’ active 
involvement in generating licensing 
income could be the basis for 
considering such income as 
                                                 
121  See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 81-178, 1981-2 C.B. 135; 
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200601033 (Oct. 14, 2005); Priv. 
Ltr. Rul. 9029047 (Apr. 27, 1990) 
122  See, e.g., NCAA v. Comm’r, 92 T.C. 456, 
468–70 (1989), rev’d on other grounds, 914 F.2d 
1417 (10th Cir. 1990); Fraternal Order of Police 
v. Comm’r, 87 T.C. 747, 758 (1986), aff’d, 833 
F.2d 717 (7th Cir. 1987). 
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commercial and therefore subject to 
the UBTI. . . . 
Bringing royalty income that accrues 
only to athletic departments under the 
UBIT would be problematic, 
however . . . . [I]f royalty income from 
licensing team names to for-profit 
businesses was truly considered 
commercial and subject to the UBIT, 
the same arguments would apply in 
full force to licensing all other 
university names and trademarks. A 
consistent policy would subject all 
such income to the UBIT because of 
its commercial nature. Such a change 
in policy could affect many other 
nonprofits in addition to colleges and 
universities . . . .123 
 
4. Corporate Sponsorships.  Under 
section 513(i) of the Internal Revenue Code, 
the receipt of qualified sponsorship 
payments by a charity does not constitute 
the receipt of income from an unrelated 
trade or business, and instead, the payment 
is treated as a charitable contribution to the 
charity.124 A “qualified sponsorship 
                                                 
123  CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PUB. NO. 3005, TAX 
PREFERENCES FOR COLLEGIATE SPORTS 13 
(2009). 
124  I.R.C. § 513(i); Treas. Reg. § 1.513-4(a). The 
Treasury Regulations provide the following 
example of a qualified sponsorship payment: 
M, a local charity, organizes a 
marathon and walkathon at which it 
serves to participants drinks and 
other refreshments provided free of 
charge by a national corporation. 
The corporation also gives M 
prizes to be awarded to the winners 
of the event. M recognizes the 
assistance of the corporation by 
listing the corporation’s name in 
promotional fliers, in newspaper 
advertisements of the event and on 
T-shirts worn by participants. M 
changes the name of its event to 
include the name of the 
corporation. M’s activities 
constitute acknowledgement of the 
sponsorship. 
Id. § 1.513-4(f), example 1. 
payment” is “any payment125 by any person 
engaged in a trade or business with respect 
to which there is no arrangement or 
expectation that the person will receive any 
substantial return benefit.”126 A “substantial 
return benefit” is any benefit other than a 
“use or acknowledgement”127 of the 
corporate sponsor and certain disregarded 
benefits.128 Substantial benefits include the 
charitable organization’s provision of 
facilities, services, or other privileges to the 
sponsor; exclusive provider relationships;129 
                                                 
125  “Payment” means “the payment of money, 
transfer of property, or performance of services.” 
Id. § 1.513-4(c)(1). 
126  Id. For purposes of these rules, it is irrelevant 
whether the sponsored activity is temporary or 
permanent. Id 
127  The permitted “uses or acknowledgements” 
under the qualified sponsorship payment rules 
include (i) “logos and slogans that do not contain 
qualitative or comparative descriptions of the 
payor’s products, services, facilities or 
company,” (ii) “a list of the payor’s locations, 
telephone numbers, or Internet address,” (iii) 
“value-neutral descriptions, including displays or 
visual depictions, of the payor’s product-line or 
services,” and (iv) “the payor’s brand or trade 
names and product or service listings.” Id. 
§ 1.513-4(c)(1)(iv). “Logos or slogans that are an 
established part of the payor’s identity are not 
considered to contain qualitative or comparative 
descriptions.” Id. 
128  Id. § 1.513-4(c)(2). A benefit is disregarded 
if “the aggregate fair market value of all the 
benefits provided to the payor or persons 
designated by the payor in connection with the 
payment during the organization’s taxable year is 
not more than two percent of the amount of the 
payment.” Id. § 1.513-4(c)(2)(ii). If this limit is 
exceeded, the entire benefit (and not just the 
amount exceeding the two percent threshold) 
provided to the payor is a substantial return 
benefit. Id. 
129 The Treasury Regulations define an 
“exclusive provider” relationship as any 
arrangement which “limits the sale, distribution, 
availability, or use of competing products, 
services or facilities in connection with an 
exempt organization’s activity.” Id. § 1.513-
4(c)(2)(vi)(B). “For example, if in exchange for a 
payment, the exempt organization agrees to 
allow only the payor’s products to be sold in 
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and any license to use intangible assets of 
the charitable organization.130 “If there is an 
arrangement or expectation that the payor 
will receive a substantial return benefit with 
respect to any payment, then only the 
portion, if any, of the payment that exceeds 
the fair market value of the substantial 
return benefit is a qualified sponsorship 
payment.”131 The exempt organization has 
the burden of establishing the fair market 
value of the substantial return benefit. If the 
organization fails to do so, “no portion of 
the payment constitutes a qualified 
sponsorship payment.”132 
 The tax treatment of any payment that 
does not represent income from a qualified 
sponsorship payment is governed by general 
UBIT principles.133 The mere fact that the 
payments are received in connection with 
the corporate sponsor receiving a substantial 
return benefit does not necessitate the 
payments constituting UBTI. For example, 
in a memorandum released by the Internal 
Revenue Service in October 2001, examples 
of certain exclusive provider relationships 
were addressed.134 Significantly, one 
example involved a contract between a soft 
drink company and a university, under 
which the soft drink company would be the 
exclusive provider of soft drinks on campus 
in return for an annual payment made to the 
university. Exclusive provider relationships 
are explicitly named as a substantial return 
benefit; therefore, the arrangement did not 
qualify as a qualified sponsorship payment. 
Because the soft drink company maintained 
the vending machines, there was no 
obligation by the university to perform any 
services on behalf of the soft drink company 
or to perform any services in connection 
with the contract. Accordingly, the 
                                                                   
connection with an activity, the payor has 
received a substantial return benefit.” Id. 
130  Id. § 1.513-4(c)(2)(iii)(D). 
131  Id. § 1.513-4(d). 
132  Id. 
133  Id. § 1.513-4(f). 
134 See IRS Issues Field Memo on Exclusive 
Providers and UBIT, 2001 TAX NOTES TODAY 
192-26 (Oct. 3, 2001). 
university did not have the level of activity 
necessary to constitute a trade or business. 
Since the contract also provided that the soft 
drink company was given a license to 
market its products using the university’s 
name and logo, the portion of the total 
payment attributable to the value of the 
license would be excluded from the 
university’s UBTI as a royalty payment. 
 If the corporate sponsorship involves 
the charity’s endorsement of the corporate 
sponsor’s product or services, then the 
income from the corporate sponsorship will 
likely be included in the charity’s UBTI as 
advertising income.  “Advertising” is “any 
message or other programming material 
which is broadcast or otherwise transmitted, 
published, displayed or distributed, and 
which promotes or markets any trade or 
business, or any service, facility or 
product.”135 Advertising includes “messages 
containing qualitative or comparative 
language, price information or other 
indications of savings or value, an 
endorsement, or an inducement to purchase, 
sell, or use any company, service, facility or 
product.”136 For example, the Internal 
                                                 
135 Treas. Reg. § 1.513-4(c)(v). 
136 Id. Typically, advertising is considered to be a 
trade or business that is unrelated to the charity’s 
exempt purposes. Thus, the question remains 
whether the advertising activity is “regularly 
carried on.” If advertising messages of a 
corporate sponsor’s product are continuously 
present on the charity’s website, such advertising 
activities would seem to be regularly carried on 
and the revenues therefrom would thus constitute 
UBTI. One counter-argument would appear to be 
that the limited number of advertisements makes 
the charity’s activities dissimilar in extent to 
comparable commercial activities. See Tech. 
Adv. Mem. 9417003 (Dec. 31, 1993) (stating 
that an advertising campaign conducted by 
placing advertisements in programs for an 
organization’s annual ball was not typical of 
commercial endeavors because solicitations for 
advertisements were limited in number and 
consisted of a single form letter). Given the 
variety and relative novelty of Internet 
advertisements, it would be unwise for a charity 
to rely upon such a position. See generally I.R.S. 
Announcement 2000-84, 2000-42 I.R.B. 385 
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Revenue Service considers the following 
messages to consist, at least in part, of 
advertising: (i) “This program has been 
brought to you by the Music Shop, located 
at 123 Main Street. For your music needs, 
give them a call at 555-1234. This station is 
proud to have the Music Shop as a 
sponsor,”137 and (ii) “Visit the Music Shop 
today for the finest selection of music CDs 
and cassette tapes.”138 If a single message 
contains both advertising and an 
acknowledgement, the message is an 
advertisement. Where the Treasury 
Regulations do not allow one to clearly 
distinguish between advertisements and 
permitted uses and acknowledgements, a 
court may be inclined to take a common-
sense approach and consider a message an 
advertisement if it “looks like” an ad.139 
 The United States Supreme Court 
considered whether advertising could be 
substantially related to an organization’s 
exempt purposes in United States v. 
American College of Physicians,140 the 
leading case on this topic. There, an exempt 
physicians’ organization received income 
from the sale of advertising in its 
professional journal. The messages in 
question consisted of advertisements for 
“pharmaceuticals, medical supplies, and 
equipment useful in the practice of internal 
                                                                   
(announcing that the Internal Revenue Service 
was considering whether clarification was 
needed as to the application of the “regularly 
carried on” requirement to business activities 
conducted on the Internet). 
137  Id. § 1.513-4(f), example 7. 
138 Id. at example 8. Where a document can be 
broken down into segments identified in the 
Treasury Regulations, a court or the Internal 
Revenue Service will likely analyze each 
segment with reference to the rules set out above. 
See, e.g., Tech. Adv. Mem. 9805001 (Oct. 7, 
1997) (concluding that an “ad” did not rise to the 
level of advertising when it consisted of a can of 
a sponsor’s pet food made to look like a trophy 
and included two slogans that had long been 
used by the sponsor in its advertising). 
139 See, e.g., State Police Ass’n of Mass. v. 
Comm’r, 125 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1997). 
140 475 U.S. 834 (1986). 
medicine.” The organization “has a long-
standing practice of accepting only 
advertisements containing information about 
the use of medical products, and screens 
proffered advertisements for accuracy and 
relevance to internal medicine.” The 
organization argued that these 
advertisements were substantially related to 
its exempt functions because they 
contributed to the education of the journal’s 
readers. At trial, experts testified that “drug 
advertising performs a valuable function for 
doctors by disseminating information on 
recent developments in drug manufacture 
and use.”141 Rejecting the organization’s 
claim and ruling that the advertising income 
was UBTI, the Supreme Court analyzed this 
issue as follows: 
[A]ll advertisements contain some 
information, and if a modicum of 
informative content were enough to 
supply the important contribution 
necessary to achieve tax exemption 
for commercial advertising, it 
would be the rare advertisement 
indeed that would fail to meet the 
test. Yet the statutory and 
regulatory scheme, even if not 
creating a per se rule against tax 
exemption, is clearly antagonistic 
to the concept of a per se rule for 
exemption . . . . Thus, the Claims 
Court properly directed its attention 
to the College’s conduct of its 
advertising business, and it found 
the following pertinent facts: 
The evidence is clear that 
plaintiff did not use the 
advertising to provide its 
readers a comprehensive or 
systematic presentation of any 
aspect of the goods or services 
publicized. Those companies 
willing to pay for advertising 
space got it; others did not. 
Moreover, some of the 
advertising was for established 
drugs or devices and was 
repeated from one month to 
another, undermining the 
suggestion that the advertising 
was principally designed to 
alert readers of recent 
developments . . . . Some ads 
                                                 
141 Id. at 847. 
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even concerned matters that 
had no conceivable 
relationship to the College’s 
tax-exempt purposes. 
. . . This is not to say that the 
College could not control its 
publication of advertisements in 
such a way as to reflect an intention 
to contribute importantly to its 
educational functions. By 
coordinating the content of the 
advertisements with the editorial 
content of the issue, or by 
publishing only advertisements 
reflecting new developments in the 
pharmaceutical market, for 
example, perhaps the College could 
satisfy the stringent standards 
erected by Congress and the 
Treasury.142 
 
C. Payments Between Controlled 
Groups.  When a charitable organization 
receives a “specified payment” from another 
entity which it controls, the payment is 
treated as unrelated business income to the 
extent the payment reduces the trade or 
business income of the controlled entity.143  
                                                 
142  Id. at 848–50 (citation omitted). Several 
cases and rulings follow the reasoning of 
American College of Physicians. See, e.g., Minn. 
Holstein-Frisian Breeders Ass’n v. Comm’r, 64 
T.C.M. (CCH) 1319 (1992) (holding that 
advertisements that may have been of “incidental 
benefit to breeders in running their day-to-day 
operations” but that did not “contribute 
importantly to improving the quality of the breed 
of Holstein-Friesian cattle” were not 
substantially related to a cattle breeding 
organization’s exempt purposes); Fla. Trucking 
Ass’n v. Comm’r, 87 T.C. 1039 (1986) (holding 
that advertisements of products of particular 
interest to the trucking industry did not bear a 
substantial relationship to the exempt functions 
of a trucking trade association); Rev. Rul. 82-
139, 1982-2 C.B. 108 (concluding that a bar 
association’s publication of advertisements for 
products and services used by the legal 
profession was not substantially related to the 
association’s exempt purposes). 
 
143  I.R.C. § 512(b)(13)(A).  A modification to 
this rule applies to “qualifying specified 
payments” (i.e., specified payments made 
pursuant to a binding written contract in effect 
The term “specified payment” means any 
interest, annuity, royalty, or rent paid to the 
controlling organization.144  For purposes of 
this rule, the term control means (1) in the 
case of a corporation, ownership (by vote or 
value) of more than 50% of the stock in a 
corporation,145 or (2) in the case of a 
partnership, ownership of more than 50% of 
the profits interest or capital interest in a 
partnership.146  In determining control, the 
constructive ownership rules of Code 
section 318 apply.147  If a partnership owns 
stock in a corporation, ownership of the 
corporation will be attributed to the partners 
in the same proportion in which the partners 
hold their interests in the partnership.148  In 
addition, if a shareholder owns 50% or more 
of the value of the stock in a corporation, 
stock in another entity owned by the 
corporation is considered as owned by its 
shareholder in proportion to the 
shareholder’s ownership interest in the 
corporation.149 
 Code Section 318 is silent with 
respect to applying attribution rules among 
tax exempt organizations. On its face, Code 
Section 318 does not seem to attribute 
ownership in an entity from one nonstock 
                                                                   
on Aug. 17, 2006) received or accrued after Dec. 
31, 2005 and before Jan. 1, 2010.  Under the 
modified rule, only the excess payments – the 
portion of the “qualifying specified payment” 
received or accrued by the controlling 
organization that exceeds the amount which 
would have been paid or accrued if such 
payment met the requirements prescribed under  
Code section 482 – is included in the controlling 
organization’s UBTI, and only to the extent such 
excess payment reduces the trade or business 
income of the controlled entity.  I.R.C. § 
512(b)(13)(E). 
 
144  I.R.C. § 512(b)(13)(C). 
145  I.R.C. § 512(b)(13)(D)(i)(I). 
 
146  I.R.C. § 512(b)(13)(D)(i)(II). 
 
147  I.R.C. § 512(b)(13)(D)(ii). 
 
148  I.R.C. § 318(a)(2)(A). 
 
149  I.R.C. § 318(a)(2)(C). 
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tax exempt organization to another because 
the attribution rules focus on one’s 
ownership interest in an organization.  
Ownership is not an appropriate criterion for 
tax exempt organizations because no one has 
an ownership interest in a nonstock tax 
exempt organization.  For example, if two 
tax exempt organizations, which have 
identical boards of directors, each own a 
50% interest in a for-profit corporation, the 
constructive ownership rules of Code 
Section 318 would not seem to attribute the 
ownership of the corporation’s stock from 
one of the tax exempt organizations to the 
other.150  Thus, since both tax exempt 
entities would own only 50% of the 
corporation’s stock, the corporation would 
not be controlled by either tax exempt 
organization.151  As a result, interest paid 
from the for-profit corporation to the tax 
exempt shareholders would not be 
considered unrelated business income.   
 However, by analogizing the 
principles of former Code Section 
512(b)(13), ownership in an entity by one 
tax-exempt organization may be attributed 
to another tax-exempt organization if there 
is a common degree of management 
between the two tax-exempt 
organizations.152  Former Code Section 
512(b)(13) defined control by reference to 
Code Section 368(c) which provides that 
ownership of at least 80% of the 
corporation’s stock effectuated control.153  
In applying the principles of Section 368(c), 
Treasury Regulation Section 
                                                 
 
150  Robert A. Wexler & Lisa R. Appleberry, 
TRA ‘97 Brings Charities a Little Relief . . . and 
Maybe a Lot of Grief, 87 J. TAX’N 360, 363 
(1997). 
 
151  See I.R.C. § 512(b)(13)(D). 
 
152  See Wexler & Appleberry, supra note 150 at 
363; see also Priv. Ltr. Rul. 199941048 (Oct. 18, 
1999). 
 
153  Former I.R.C. § 512(b)(13) (repealed by P.L. 
105-34 §  1041(a)) (effective for tax years 
beginning before August 6, 1997). 
1.512(b)-1(l)(4)(i)(b) states that in the 
context of nonstock tax-exempt 
organizations, control exists between two or 
more tax-exempt organizations in which 
more than 50% of the governing boards 
overlap.154 
 
D. Unrelated Debt Financed Income.  
Property acquired by an exempt 
organization with borrowed funds may be 
considered debt-financed property.155  Debt-
financed property is property held by a 
charitable organization to produce income 
that is encumbered by acquisition 
indebtedness at any time during the taxable 
year.156  The term “acquisition 
indebtedness” refers to acquisition or 
indebtedness incurred in connection with the 
acquisition or improvement of property, 
whether the debt is incurred before, after, or 
at the time of acquisition.157  There are 
several exceptions to the term acquisition 
indebtedness, including exceptions for 
property acquired by gift, bequest, or devise, 
indebtedness incurred in performing the 
organization’s exempt function, and certain 
real property acquired by educational 
organizations, qualified plans, and multiple-
parent title holding organizations.158  
Exceptions under which property acquired 
with financing escapes classification as 
debt-financed property include property 
used by an organization in performing its 
exempt function, property used in an 
unrelated trade or business, and property 
acquired for prospective exempt use.159   
 A certain portion of income derived 
from debt-financed property must be 
included in unrelated business taxable 
income as an item of gross income derived 
from an unrelated trade or business.160  
Similarly, a certain portion of the deductions 
                                                 
 
154  Wexler & Appleberry, supra note 150 at 363. 
155  I.R.C. § 514(b). 
156  I.R.C. § 514(b)(1).  
157  I.R.C. § 514(c)(1). 
158  I.R.C. § 514(c). 
159  I.R.C. § 514(b)(1), (3). 
160  I.R.C. § 514(a)(1). 
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directly connected with debt-financed 
property are allowed as deductions in 
computing unrelated business taxable 
income.161  The portion of income and 
deduction that must be taken into account is 
determined by applying a debt/basis 
percentage, which is equal to the ratio of the 
average acquisition indebtedness for the 
taxable year with respect to the property 
over the average amount of the adjusted 
basis of the property during the period it is 
held by the organization during the taxable 
year.162   
 The treatment of income and 
deductions from debt-financed property 
described above overrides the modifications 
from unrelated business taxable income 
otherwise provided for dividends, interest, 
payments with respect to securities loans, 
annuities, loan commitment fees, royalties, 
rents, and gains and losses from the sale, 
exchange, or other disposition of property.163  
In other words, the amount ascertained 
under the debt-financed property rules is 
expressly required to be included as an item 
of gross income derived from an unrelated 
trade or business despite the fact that the 
source of such income is passive in nature. 
 
 E. Partnerships.  Section 702(b) of 
the Code provides that the character in the 
hands of a partner of an item of partnership 
income is determined as if the item were 
realized directed from the source from 
which realized by the partnership.  For 
example, if an entity’s share of partnership 
income is derived from debt-financed 
property, the income from the property is 
generally taxable as debt-financed 
income.164 
                                                 
161  I.R.C. § 514(a)(2). 
162  I.R.C. § 514(a)(1). 
163  I.R.C. § 512(b)(4). 
164  See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 74-197, 1974-1 C.B. 143.  
Example 4 in Treasury Regulation Section 
1.514(c)-1(a)(2) specifically demonstrates that 
this is so.  Treas. Reg. § 1.514(c)-1(a)(2), 
example 4.  Relying upon Section 702(b), 
Example 4 explains that if an entity (“X”) is a 
limited partner in a partnership that borrows 
money to purchase an office building for lease to 
 
 Technical Advice Memorandum 
9651001 indicates that the use of multiple 
pass-through entities does not change this 
result.165  There, an exempt organization 
(“X”) held an interest in a limited 
partnership (“Z”).  Z in turn owned an 
interest in a joint venture (“Venture”).  
Venture owned property that was collateral 
for a mortgage note.  X eventually sold its 
interest in Z.  The issue in the Technical 
Advice Memorandum was whether this sale 
was subject to unrelated business income tax 
under Section 511 of the Code because Z 
owned debt-financed property.  The IRS 
concluded that it was, explaining, “[a]n 
interest in a partnership that holds 
debt-financed property is effectively an 
interest in the underlying assets and 
liabilities of the partnership.  An anomalous 
result would occur if ownership of 
debt-financed property through a partnership 
would result in one tax treatment when 
direct ownership would result in another.”  
Under this reasoning, the same result 
follows if the income in question was 
derived from debt-financed property other 
than through a sale of the exempt entity’s 
interest in a pass-through entity.  Regardless 
of how many layers of pass-through entities 
are imposed, the “lowest level” entity’s 
property would effectively be owned by 
each entity up the line, and would ultimately 
effectively be owned by the tax exempt 
entity. 
 To avoid the realization of debt-
financed income through an investment in a 
limited partnership or hedge fund, charitable 
organizations often use “blocker” entities to 
acquire these investments.  A “blocker” 
entity is a corporate entity that is interposed 
between the investment and the charitable 
organization.  The corporation “blocks” the 
attribution of any debt in the investment 
partnership to the charitable organization, 
and thus enables the charitable organization 
to avoid the application of the debt-financed 
                                                                   
the general public, X’s share of the income from 
the building is debt-financed income.  Id. 
165  Tech. Adv. Mem. 9651001 (Dec. 20, 1996). 
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income rules with respect to the investment 
income generated by the investment 
partnership.  Rather, the partnership income 
is taxed to the corporate blocker entity.  
Often, the blocker entity is a foreign 
corporation formed in a low tax jurisdiction.  
As a result, the blocker entity pays little or 
no tax on the income from the investment 
partnership or hedge fund.  The blocker 
entity in turn distributes the income received 
from the investment partnership to the 
charitable organization in the form of 
dividends, which is excluded from the 
charitable organization’s unrelated business 
taxable income.166  The IRS has issued a 
private letter ruling determining that 
dividends received by a charitable 
organization from a foreign corporation used 
as a blocker entity is not subject to the 
unrelated business income tax.167  Although 
the use of blocker entities may appear to be 
a “loophole,” blocker entities are often used 
to avoid the application of the unrelated 
debt-financed income rules to passive 
investments that were never intended to be 
within the scope of the rules. 
 
 F. S Corporations.  Charities are 
able to hold S corporation shares without 
breaking the S election.168  However, all 
income distributable to a charitable S 
corporation shareholder will be treated as 
unrelated business taxable income from an 
asset deemed in its entirety to be an interest 
in unrelated trade or business.169  
Consequently, “(i) all items of income, loss, 
or deduction taken into account under 
Section 1366(a), and (ii) any gain or loss on 
the disposition of the stock in the S 
corporation shall be taken into account in 
computing the unrelated business taxable 
income of such organization.”170  In 
addition, the basis of any S corporation 
stock acquired by purchase is reduced by the 
amount of dividends received by the 
                                                 
166  See I.R.C. § 512(b)(1). 
167  Priv. Ltr. Rul. 199952086 (Sept. 30, 1999). 
168  See I.R.C. § 1361(c)(6). 
169  I.R.C. § 512(e). 
170  Id. 
charitable organization with respect to the 
stock.171 
 
 G. Public Disclosure of Information 
Relating to the Unrelated Business Income 
Tax.  Charitable organizations are required 
to make their annual Form 990/Form 990PF 
information returns and exemption materials 
available for public inspection.172  
Organizations that have unrelated business 
income also have to file a Form 990-T 
return.  Charitable organizations described 
in Section 501(c)(3)173 are required to make 
their Form 990-T returns174 available for 
public inspection.175  Certain information 
may be withheld by the charitable 
organization from public disclosure and 
inspection (e.g., information relating to a 
trade secret, patent, process, style of work, 
or apparatus of the charitable organization) 
if the Secretary determines that public 
disclosure of such information would 
adversely affect the charitable 
organization.176  Under the commensurate in 
scope test, an exempt organization may 
generate a significant amount of UBTI so 
long as it performs charitable programs that 
are commensurate in scope with its financial 
resources.177  However, if a substantial 
portion of the charity’s income is from 
                                                 
171  I.R.C. § 512(e)(2). 
172  I.R.C. § 6104(d)(1)(A). 
173 This requirement applies to all charitable 
organizations which file Form 990-T returns, 
regardless of whether such organizations are also 
required to file annual Form 990/Form 990PF 
information returns.  However, state colleges and 
universities which are exempt from income tax 
solely under Section 115 of the Code are not 
required to make their Form 990-T returns 
available for public inspection.  Notice 2007-45, 
2007-22 I.R.B. 1320. 
174 An exact copy of the Form 990-T return, 
including all schedules, attachments and 
supporting documents must be disclosed.  Notice 
2007-45, 2007-22 I.R.B. 1320. 
175  I.R.C. § 6104(d)(1)(A)(ii). 
176 Staff of the Joint Comm. on Tax’n, 109th 
Cong., Technical Explanation of H.R. 4, The 
“Pension Protection Act of 2006,” JCX-38-06 
(Aug. 3, 2006) at 330. 
177  Rev. Rul. 64-182, 1964-1 C.B. 186. 
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unrelated activities, the organization fails to 
qualify for exemption.178 
 
H. Effect of Unrelated Business Activities 
on the Charity’s Tax-Exempt Status.  In 
order to obtain and maintain tax-exempt 
status, a charity must be operated primarily 
for the purposes described in Section 
501(c)(3) of the Code.  Accordingly, if a 
charity engages in too much unrelated 
business activity, it risks the loss of its tax-
exempt status as no longer satisfying this 
operational test.  There is no bright line rule 
with respect to how much unrelated business 
income a charity may receive without 
jeopardizing its tax-exempt status.179  
Whether an organization has a substantial 
non-exempt purpose is a question of fact.180 
 
I. Use of Taxable Subsidiaries.  If a 
charity engages in an activity that may 
produce substantial unrelated business 
income, the charity should consider 
conducting the activity through a taxable 
corporate subsidiary wholly owned by the 
charity.  The taxable subsidiary will be 
responsible for paying income tax on the net 
taxable income from the activity.  The net 
income may then be distributed to the 
charity in the form of dividends which 
generally are excluded from a charity’s 
UBTI. 
                                                 
178  Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1). 
179 In making this determination, courts may 
examine the amount of time or money spent on 
carrying out an unrelated trade or business.  See 
Orange County Agricultural Society v. Comm’r, 
893 F.2d 529 (2d Cir. 1990), aff'g 55 T.C.M. 
1602 (1988) (denying exempt status where an 
organization received approximately one-third of 
its gross income from unrelated business 
activities). 
180  See Better Business Bureau of Washington, 
D.C., Inc. v. United States, 326 U.S. 279 (1945) 
(holding that the presence of a single, non-
exempt purpose, if substantial in nature, will 
destroy exemption regardless of the number of 
importance of truly exempt purposes); B.S.W. 
Group v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 352 (1978); 
Nationalist Movement v. Comm’r, 102 T.C. 558, 
559 (1994), aff'd, 37 F.3d 216 (5th Cir. 1994). 
 One advantage of this structure is that 
the activities of the taxable subsidiary 
normally will not be attributed to the charity.  
This is especially important if the conduct of 
the activity is so substantial that it may 
jeopardize the charity’s tax-exemption.  
Second, the charity will not be required to 
file a Form 990-T related to the activity, 
which is available for public inspection.  
Although the taxable subsidiary will file a 
Form 1120, such form is not required to be 
made publicly available.  Third, use of a 
taxable subsidiary can protect the charity’s 
assets from liabilities arising from the 
conduct of the unrelated business activity 
and isolate those liabilities to the taxable 
subsidiary.  Finally, a taxable subsidiary can 
provide greater flexibility in structuring the 
unrelated business activity. 
 However, use of a taxable subsidiary 
may increase administrative burdens and 
costs of the charity.  Additionally, the 
dividends from the taxable subsidiary may 
no longer be exempt from UBIT if the 
charity transfers debt-financed property to 
the taxable subsidiary.181  If the charity 
provides administrative services to its 
taxable subsidiary for a fee, the IRS may 
reallocate income between the charity and 
the taxable subsidiary under Code section 
482.  Finally, as discussed above, if the 
charity receives interest, rent, annuity 
payments or royalties from its controlled 
taxable subsidiary, such payment may be 
treated as unrelated business income to the 
charity to the extent the payment reduces the 
trade or business income of the taxable 
subsidiary.182 
 
V. Cause-Related Marketing.183  Cause-
related marketing involves a charity forming 
                                                 
181 I.R.C. § 357(c); Rev. Rul. 77-71, 1977-1 C.B. 
155. 
 
182  I.R.C. § 512(b)(13). 
183 Portions of this discussion on cause-related 
marketing are extracted from the author’s 
previously published article, The Taxation of 
Cause-Related Marketing, 85 CHI-KENT L. REV. 
883 (2010). 
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alliances with one or more for-profit 
corporations to allow the charity’s name or 
logo to be used in marketing the 
corporation’s products or services.184  Such 
alliances may include selling merchandise 
which prominently displays the charity’s 
name, logo, or trademark message in 
conjunction with a corporate partner  or 
allowing the charity’s name or logo to be 
displayed on promotional products of the 
corporate partner, with a portion of the sales 
proceeds of those promotional products 
donated to the charity.  Cause-related 
marketing alliances provide mutual benefits 
to the charity and the corporate partner. 
Charities benefit by the amount of donations 
received directly from the campaign and by 
increasing resources and awareness of the 
charity and its mission.185  The corporate 
partners benefit because cause-related 
marketing activities are generally profit 
motivated, with donations based upon 
consumer behavior in the form of 
purchasing the sponsoring company’s 
products or services.186  When a charity 
engages in a cause-related marketing 
alliance, the charity must carefully structure 
the alliance or the income the charity 
receives from the alliance may be treated as 
unrelated business income. 
 
A. Sale of Merchandise Directly by 
Charity.  A charity which directly sells 
                                                 
184 See, e.g. Dennis R. Young, Commercialism in 
Nonprofit Social Service Associations: Its 
Character, Significance, and Rationale, in TO 
PROFIT OR NOT TO PROFIT 195, 198 (Burton A. 
Weisbrod ed., 1998) (defining cause-related 
marketing as involving “‘a relationship which 
ties a company, its customers and selected 
products to an issue or cause with the goal of 
improving sales and corporate image while 
providing substantial income and benefits to the 
cause’” (citation omitted)). 
185 See Stacy Landreth Grau & Judith Anne 
Garretson Folse, Cause-Related Marketing 
(CRM): The Influence of Donation Proximity 
and Message-Framing Cues on the Less-
Involved Consumer, J. ADVERTISING, Winter 
2007, at 19, 20. 
186 Id. 
merchandise bearing the charity’s name, 
logo, or other cause-related message would 
analyze whether the receipts from the sale of 
such merchandise are UBTI under the 
general three-prong UBTI test.  The sale of 
the merchandise typically is an activity 
carried on for the production of income from 
the sale of goods. Additionally, a charity 
would normally engage in the sales of the 
merchandise continuously throughout the 
year.  Accordingly, the sale of the 
merchandise would be considered a 
regularly carried on trade or business. 
Whether the receipts from the sale of the 
merchandise are UBTI would depend on 
whether the sale of the merchandise is 
substantially related to the charity’s exempt 
purpose. 
 Where a charity sells merchandise, the 
merchandise is examined on an item-by-
item basis to determine if sales of such 
merchandise further the organization’s 
exempt purposes.187  Generally, if the 
primary purpose of an item is utilitarian, 
ornamental, or token, selling such an item is 
not substantially related to the 
organization’s exempt purposes.188  In 
contrast, if the utilitarian aspects of the item 
are incidental to the item’s relationship to 
the organization’s exempt purpose, the sale 
of such an item is considered to be 
substantially related to the organization’s 
exempt purpose.189  In addition, merely 
placing an exempt organization’s name or 
logo on an item otherwise unrelated to its 
exempt purpose will not prevent sales 
proceeds from constituting UBTI.190  
However, in several private rulings, the 
Internal Revenue Service has reached the 
contrary conclusion regarding the sale of t-
shirts and similar items bearing an 
                                                 
187 See e.g., Tech. Adv. Mem. 9720002 (Nov. 26, 
1996). 
188 See, e.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200222030 (Mar. 4, 
2002); Tech. Adv. Mem. 8024111 (Jan. 3, 1980). 
189 See Tech. Adv. Mem. 8605002 (Sept. 4, 
1985); Tech. Adv. Mem. 832-009 (Mar. 30, 
1983). 
190 See, e.g., Tech. Adv. Mem. 8326003 (Nov. 
17, 1982). 
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organization’s name or symbol when 
additional facts indicated that the sales 
furthered the organization’s exempt 
purpose.191 
 Most recently, the Internal Revenue 
Service privately ruled in 2007 that the sale 
of merchandise bearing the symbol for 
breast cancer awareness by a charity formed 
to educate the general public about early 
detection of breast cancer was substantially 
related to the charity’s exempt purpose.192  
Thus, the proceeds from the sale of the 
breast cancer awareness merchandise were 
excluded from the charity’s UBTI.  The 
branded merchandise described in the ruling 
included pins, apparel, home and office 
products, jewelry, and special gifts.  All 
branded merchandise either displayed a pink 
ribbon, the universal symbol for breast 
cancer awareness, or were the color pink, 
the universal color for breast cancer 
awareness.  Included with the packaging of 
each item was a bookmark providing the 
charity’s recommended three-step approach 
to positive breast health and the charity’s 
toll-free number and web address.  The 
Internal Revenue Service concluded that the 
sale of the merchandise “reminds and 
encourages those who wear, display, or see 
the images, about breast cancer. The sale of 
these items further enhances [the charity’s] 
message that early detection of breast cancer 
and positive breast health practice save lives 
and is, accordingly, related to the 
organization’s exempt purposes.”  
 Even though this type of merchandise 
sold by a charity typically has some 
utilitarian value, such as a t-shirt, hat, 
wristband, or pin, it appears that if the 
charity carefully links the sale of the 
merchandise to the spreading of the charity’s 
message, the sale of the merchandise may be 
considered substantially related to the 
charity’s exempt purpose.193  The charity’s 
                                                 
191 See, e.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8633034 (May 20, 
1986); Tech. Adv. Mem. 9436001 (Sept. 24, 
1993). 
192 Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200722028 (Mar. 9, 2007). 
193 Conducting sales through a third-party vendor 
should not change this result. The Internal 
position would be significantly weakened if 
the charity’s primary purpose in selling the 
merchandise is to generate income.194  
Internal Revenue Service interest in the sales 
of the branded merchandise may increase as 
the scope and extent of sales increase. The 
Treasury Regulations provide that “[i]n 
determining whether activities contribute 
importantly to the accomplishment of an 
exempt purpose, the size and extent of the 
activities involved must be considered in 
relation to the nature and extent of the 
exempt function which they purport to 
serve.”195  Therefore, 
where income is realized by an 
exempt organization from 
activities that are in part related 
to the performance of its exempt 
functions, but which are 
conducted on a larger scale than 
is reasonably necessary for 
performance of such functions, 
[the gross income] of the 
activities in excess of the needs 
of the exempt functions 
constitutes gross income from 
the conduct of unrelated trade or 
business.196 
Thus, the more popular the branded 
merchandise becomes, the more the sales of 
the branded merchandise will increase and 
the more likely the charity will become 
subject to this type of attack. 
 
B. Sale of Merchandise by Corporate 
Partner.  For sales of merchandise directly 
by the corporate partner containing the 
charity’s name or logo, different 
considerations apply in determining whether 
the income received by the charity from the 
arrangement is excluded from the charity’s 
UBTI. Many cause-related marketing 
                                                                   
Revenue Service has accepted that appropriately 
conducted sales of certain items to the public 
through unrelated retailers do not result in UBTI. 
See Tech. Adv. Mem. 9550003 (Sept. 18, 1995).  
194 See, e.g., Disabled Am. Veterans v. Comm’r, 
650 F.2d 1178, 1183 (Ct. Cl. 1981) 
195 Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(3). 
196 Id. 
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alliances involve recognition of the 
corporate partner’s participation by the 
charity on its website and in print materials. 
Thus, this section first analyzes the possible 
application of the corporate sponsorship 
rules to cause-related marketing alliances. 
Cause-related marketing alliances also 
involve payment for the use of the charity’s 
name, logo, or trademark; accordingly, this 
section next analyzes the application of the 
royalty exception to cause-related marketing 
alliances. Finally, because consumer 
perception of product endorsement by the 
charity might be considered as a factor in the 
UBTI analysis, this section analyzes whether 
the income received from cause-related 
marketing alliances could be included in 
UBTI as advertising income. 
 
1. Corporate sponsorship rules do not 
(fully) address the issue.  The corporate 
sponsorship rules were enacted to address 
the situation where the charity uses the 
corporate sponsor’s logo on the charity’s 
materials. Cause-related marketing alliances 
typically involve the use of the charity’s 
name or logo on the corporate partner’s 
products. At first blush, the corporate 
sponsorship exception seemingly would not 
apply to cause-related marketing. However, 
cause-related marketing alliances often 
involve the charity’s recognition of the 
alliance by acknowledging the corporate 
partner on the charity’s website or print 
materials. Therefore, a charity may claim 
that at least a portion of the payment 
received is a “sponsorship payment” and 
attempt to treat that portion separately from 
the other revenue received from the cause-
related marketing alliance. In particular, this 
may be the case where the alliance 
guarantees the charity a minimum 
“contribution” from the corporate partner 
from the sale of the promotional 
merchandise. 
 In order for a sponsorship payment 
received by a charity to be excluded from 
the charity’s UBTI as a qualified 
sponsorship payment, the affiliation cannot 
provide a substantial return benefit to the 
corporate partner.197  Since cause-related 
marketing alliances grant the corporate 
partner a license to use the charity’s name 
and logo on the product, such a right would 
be a substantial return benefit.198 
Nonetheless, the portion, if any, of the 
payment that exceeds the fair market value 
of the license to use the charity’s name or 
logo may still be a qualified sponsorship 
payment.199  
 In conjunction with the corporate 
partner’s use of the charity’s name or logo, 
the charity may acknowledge the affiliation 
on the charity’s website or printed materials. 
Depending on how the charity describes its 
affiliation with the corporate partner, the 
“use or acknowledgement” exception may 
not apply. The display of the logos and/or 
slogans of the corporate partners are “uses 
or acknowledgements.” The provision of 
hyperlinks to various sponsors’ Internet sites 
also constitutes merely “uses or 
acknowledgements,” provided the sponsor’s 
Internet site does not contain additional 
statements indicating that the charity 
promotes the sponsor or its products or 
services.200  However, the provision of the 
hyperlink to the sponsor’s website by the 
charity may be for the purpose of 
encouraging consumers to purchase the 
merchandise from the sponsor because the 
proceeds from those sales benefit the 
charity. Since the corporate sponsorship 
rules were not designed with cause-related 
marketing activities in mind, they do not 
address whether the charity’s motivation in 
providing the link to the partner’s website 
should be taken into account in determining 
whether the charity is promoting the 
sponsor’s products or services. 
 
                                                 
197 See Treas. Reg. § 1.513-4(c)(1). 
198 A “substantial return benefit” is any benefit 
other than a “use or acknowledgement” of the 
corporate sponsor.  Treas. Reg. § 1.513-4(c)(2).  
Importantly, substantial benefits include any 
license to use intangible assets of the charitable 
organization.  Treas. Reg. § 1.513-4(c)(2)(iii). 
199 Treas. Reg. § 1.513-4(c)(2)(iv). 
200  Treas. Reg. § 1.513-4(f), examples 11 & 12; 
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200303062 (Oct. 22, 2002). 
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2. Use of the charity’s name or logo may 
(or may not) fit within the royalty exception.  
Based on the success of taxpayers in 
establishing royalty treatment for payments 
for the use of the charity’s name and logo in 
the affinity card context,201 it would seem 
that the payments received by a charity for 
the licensing of their name, logo, and 
trademarks in connection with the sale of the 
merchandise by the corporate partner should 
also be considered royalties and thus exempt 
from the charity’s UBTI. This result 
presupposes that the charity is not 
performing more than an insubstantial 
amount of services in connection with the 
licensing of the charity’s name, logo, and 
trademarks. If the charity performs more 
than insubstantial services, then the income 
received is considered compensation for 
personal services, the royalty exception 
would not apply, and the income would 
most likely be subject to tax as UBTI.202 
 However, the law is not clear that the 
use of the charity’s name or logo on the 
corporate partner’s products fits within the 
royalty exception. If the charity’s name or 
logo is placed on the corporate partner’s 
product, the payment could instead be 
viewed as received in connection with the 
                                                 
201 See, e.g., Or. State Univ. Alumni Ass’n v. 
Comm’r, 193 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 1999); 
Common Cause v. Comm’r, 112 T.C. 332 
(1999); Sierra Club, Inc. v. Comm’r, 77 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 1569 (1999); Miss. State Univ. Alumni, 
Inc. v. Comm’r, 74 T.C.M. (CCH) 458 (1997).  
Generally, an affinity credit card arrangement 
provides that a credit card company may use the 
exempt organization’s name in connection with a 
credit card, and the organization will receive a 
certain percentage, or “royalty,” from the income 
generated by the credit card.  Based on such 
cases, the Internal Revenue Manual now 
indicates that the Internal Revenue Service will 
consider payments under affinity credit card 
arrangements royalties as long as only minimal 
services are provided by the exempt 
organization’s members or employees. See 
I.R.S., INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL § 7.27.6.7.3 
(CCH 1999). 
202 See Sierra Club Inc. v. Comm’r, 86 F.3d 
1526, 1532 (9th Cir. 1996). 
joint advertisement of the product.203  
Especially relevant in this analysis is 
consumer perception of apparent 
endorsement of the product by the charity 
because the charity has allowed its name and 
logo to be placed on the product without 
qualification. Although the licensing 
agreement and official position of the 
charity may state that the charity does not 
endorse the product, the charity normally 
retains the right to approve how its name 
and logo are used on the product. By 
approving the placement of its name and 
logo on the product, the charity may be held 
to the reasonable impressions such cause-
related marketing leaves in the minds of 
consumers. If the charity’s name and logo 
are used in such a way as to give consumers 
the impression that the charity endorses the 
product, the charity may be deemed to have 
endorsed the product. If the Internal 
Revenue Service looks beyond the explicit 
terms of the agreement to the manner in 
which the agreement is carried out, the 
payment may be considered advertising 
income received by the charity and may no 
longer be excluded from the charity’s UBTI. 
 
3. Revenue from cause-related marketing 
may be advertising.  Both the courts and the 
Internal Revenue Service generally consider 
the publication and distribution of 
advertising by a charity to be unrelated to 
the accomplishment of the charity’s exempt 
                                                 
203 Whether the placement of a charity’s name or 
logo on a corporate partner’s product is a joint 
advertisement is a fact specific determination. In 
some cases, the association between the charity’s 
mission and the corporate partner’s product is 
such that it would be clear the charity is not 
impliedly endorsing the corporate partner’s 
product. In other cases, the charity’s mission and 
the corporate partner’s product are so closely 
aligned that it is unclear whether the charity 
endorses the corporate partner’s product. The 
issue is prevalent because the most successful 
cause-related marketing alliances occur when the 
charity’s mission and corporate partner’s 
products are closely aligned. 
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purposes.204  If the charity conducts 
advertising activities on a regular basis, then 
the advertising income generally is taxable 
as unrelated business income. 
 Generally, displaying the charity’s 
name or logo on the advertisement likely 
would not be sufficient to cause the 
advertising to be substantially related to the 
charity’s exempt purposes. Although there 
are no rulings or other primary authorities 
considering receipts from advertisements 
bearing an exempt organization’s name or 
logo, the Internal Revenue Service has 
considered receipts from the direct sale of 
items bearing an exempt organization’s 
name or logo.  If the inclusion of the 
charity’s name or logo on items directly sold 
by the charity would not prevent receipts 
from constituting UBTI, then a fortiori, 
there is little reason to suppose that receipts 
from advertisements of a third party’s 
products or services which contain the 
charity’s name or logo would not constitute 
UBTI. However, as discussed above, the 
Internal Revenue Service has on occasion 
reached a contrary conclusion regarding the 
sale of t-shirts and similar items bearing an 
organization’s name or symbol, where 
additional facts demonstrated how the items 
furthered the organization’s exempt 
function. If such additional facts are 
present—for example, if the items 
advertised displayed the charity’s 
message—this would be a positive factor. 
Note, though, that the positive rulings would 
still not be directly applicable to receipts 
obtained from a sponsor for advertising a 
product. One would need to closely examine 
all of the facts and circumstances to 
determine the extent to which the 
advertising activity promoted the charity’s 
message (as opposed to promoting the 
corporate partner more generally), with 
unpredictable results. 
 
C. Private Benefit Concerns of Cause-
Related Marketing.   The purpose of cause-
                                                 
204 See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(iv), 
example 7; United States v. Am. College of 
Physicians , 475 U.S. 834 (1986). 
related marketing is to leverage the goodwill 
of the charity in a joint campaign that 
provides mutual benefits for the charity 
(increased donations) and the corporate 
partner (sale of the merchandise), but this 
raises concerns about whether cause-related 
marketing alliances produce impermissible 
private benefit for the corporate partner.  
Two examples addressing whether private 
inurement (which is similar to private 
benefit)  has occurred are instructive in 
determining whether the private benefit 
argument would be applied to cause-related 
marketing activities. General Counsel 
Memorandum 37,289 provides the first 
example; there, the Internal Revenue Service 
concluded that a joint advertising campaign 
carried on between a nonprofit organization 
and a for-profit organization was not 
indicative of private inurement.  Although 
the circumstances are somewhat unclear, it 
appears that the for-profit organization 
conducted all of the advertising while the 
nonprofit organization paid a sales 
commission. The Internal Revenue Service 
reasoned that (i) the for-profit entity was not 
capitalizing on the nonprofit’s goodwill 
(because the nonprofit had only recently 
been created) and (ii) joint advertising set up 
a cost-efficient economy with quid pro quo 
benefits to both entities.  The Internal 
Revenue Service distinguished Restland 
Memorial Park v. United States—the second 
example case—in which a joint advertising 
campaign between a nonprofit cemetery 
company and a for-profit entity did result in 
private inurement, because the nonprofit 
entity’s goodwill was used to benefit the for-
profit entity.  
 An evaluation of whether the private 
benefits received by the corporate partner 
are more than incidental is difficult at best. 
To be incidental, the benefit must be both 
quantitatively and qualitatively incidental.  
A benefit is quantitatively incidental if, after 
considering the overall public benefit 
conferred by the activity, the private benefit 
is not substantial.  This requires a 
comparison of the value of the private 
benefit to the value of the public benefit of 
the cause related-marketing alliance. Neither 
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valuation is easy. Some of the private 
benefits to the corporate partner may be 
quantifiable, such as increased sales or 
revenues, but the value of many of the 
benefits, such as enhanced corporate 
goodwill, improved employee morale, and 
increase in customer esteem, may be 
difficult to value. 
 The benefit is incidental in the 
qualitative sense if it is “a necessary 
concomitant of the activity that benefits the 
public at large.”  In other words, the activity 
only can be accomplished by benefiting the 
private party.  Cause-related marketing 
alliances are viewed by the charity as a 
means of fundraising. The application of this 
test to fundraising activities is difficult as 
the test was designed to be applied to the 
carrying out of the organization’s charitable 
activities. To be sure, fundraising is a 
necessary activity of most charities. A literal 
application of this test would appear to 
prohibit any private benefit from fundraising 
activities as long as it is possible to raise 
funds without conferring any benefit on the 
donors (i.e., by raising funds only from 
purely gratuitous donations). Yet, in many 
fundraising campaigns donors receive some 
benefit in return, whether it be recognition 
of their generosity or a trinket item that 
donors can use or display to show their 
support.  
The end result of the private benefit 
analysis is to compare the value of the 
benefits flowing to the corporate partner 
against the value of the benefits flowing to 
the charity from the cause-related marketing 
alliance. In addition to the monetary benefits 
received from the cause-related marketing 
alliance, the charity benefits in the form of 
increased awareness of the charity’s 
message and name recognition because the 
charity gains publicity from the corporate 
partner’s marketing efforts to promote the 
alliance.  The actual benefit of increased 
publicity of the charity resulting from a 
cause-related marketing alliance is hard to 
quantify, and necessitates a fact specific 
inquiry that may vary widely from one 
charity to the next.  For example, it may be 
that a local unfamiliar charity can benefit 
greatly from the publicity achieved in a 
cause-related marketing alliance with a well-
known corporate partner.  Such an alliance 
could result in the charity becoming a 
household name, possibly resulting is 
additional individual donations to the 
charity.  In contrast, a well-established 
charity may not gain as much additional 
public goodwill from a cause-related 
marketing alliance with a well-known 
corporate partner.  Since the charity’s name 
and message are already well-known, 
increased publicity of the charity’s name or 
message by the corporate partner may not 
provide much additional benefit to the 
charity.  In this scenario, rather, the 
corporate partner may benefit more by 
leveraging the existing public goodwill of 
the well-known charity to promote increased 
public goodwill for the corporate partner. 
When a comparison of the benefits to 
both the charity and the corporate partner 
produces a substantial discrepancy in favor 
of the corporate partner, the cause-related 
marketing alliance would result in 
impermissible private benefit. Yet, cause-
related marketing activities on the whole are 
generally not a significant part of the 
charity’s activities. Therefore, revocation of 
the charity’s tax-exempt status, the only 
remedy currently available for violation of 
the private benefit doctrine, is harsh and 
likely unwarranted. Rather, concerns about 
impermissible private benefit should be 
factored into a safe harbor guidance that 
identifies specific cause-related marketing 
activities which would not jeopardize a 
charity’s tax-exempt status. 
 
VI. Investment in Social Enterprises.  
Social enterprises are businesses whose 
primary purpose is the common good. Social 
enterprises “use the methods and disciplines 
of business and the power of the 
marketplace to advance their social, 
environmental and human justice 
agendas.”205  Key distinctions between a 
                                                 
205  Social Enterprise Alliance, What’s a Social 
Enterprise, at https://www.se-alliance.org/what-
is-social-enterprise; cf. Cassady V. (“Cass”) 
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social enterprise and a charitable 
organization include: (i) a social enterprise 
may have individual owners who receive 
periodic distributions of net earnings of the 
social enterprise; (ii) a social enterprise 
generally does not qualify for tax-exemption 
as a charitable organization; and (iii) a social 
enterprise is more flexible in its ability to 
access capital markets and conduct its 
activities to accomplish its purposes because 
the social enterprise is not subject to the 
restrictions imposed on charitable 
organizations under the Code.   
 Currently, researchers believe that over 
50% of nonprofits have at least one or more 
social enterprises,206 which makes UBIT an 
important issue within many of them. In 
addition, in the past few years, there has 
been growth in social enterprise in the 
nonprofit sector in the United States spurred 
by a number of factors: reductions in 
government funding, increased client need, 
and interest in diversifying funding sources. 
The social needs addressed by social 
enterprises are widely diverse as well as the 
business models employed by social 
enterprises to accomplish their purposes.   
 Many states have created new 
organizational forms for social enterprises, 
including the low-profit limited liability 
company (“L3C”).207  The L3C starts with 
                                                                   
Brewer, A Novel Approach to Using LLCs for 
Quasi-Charitable Endeavors, 38 WM. MITCHELL 
L. REV. 678, 679 (2012) (noting that “there is no 
universally accepted legal meaning of the term 
‘social enterprise.’”). 
206 Social Enterprise Alliance, Social 
Enterprises: A Snapshot (Apr. 2009), available at 
https://www.se-alliance.org/resources.  Most 
organizations operate social enterprises as a 
division of the parent organization.  Id. 
 
207 See Dana Brakman Reiser, Governing and 
Financing Blended Enterprise, 85 CHI-KENT L. 
REV. 619, 620 (2010).  Legislation authorizing 
the L3C form has been enacted in 9 states:  
Illinois, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, North 
Carolina, Rhode Island, Utah, Vermont, and 
Wyoming.  See Americans for Community 
Redevelopment, Legislation, Laws at 
http://americansforcommunitydevelopment.org/l
the traditional limited liability company 
form and adds features that evidence the 
L3C promotion of common good over 
profit-maximization for its members.208  The 
L3C is distinguished from a traditional 
limited liability company by four core 
elements: (i) the L3C must operate to 
significantly further the accomplishment of 
charitable or educational purposes; (ii) the 
L3C would not have been formed but for its 
relationship to the accomplishment of these 
purposes; (iii) income production or capital 
appreciation may not be a significant 
purpose of the L3C; and (iv) the L3C may 
not pursue purposes that would disqualify a 
charity from exemption under the limitations 
on lobbying activities and political 
campaign activities imposed by the Code.209  
The L3C statutes were designed to allow 
private foundations to invest in properly 
formed L3Cs as qualifying program-related 
investments.210  Accordingly, the four core 
elements distinguishing L3Cs from 
traditional limited liability companies were 
derived primarily with this narrow focus in 
mind.211 
 Another new state business form for 
social enterprises gaining popularity is the 
                                                                   
aws.php for links to the legislation in those states 
adopting the L3C form. 
208 See Reiser, supra note 207 at 621. 
209 Id. 
210 Id. at 622.  A program-related investment 
(“PRI”) must have as its primary purpose the 
accomplishment of one or more charitable 
purposes and no significant purpose may be the 
production or income or capital appreciation.  
I.R.C. § 4944(c).  PRIs have a couple of distinct 
advantages for private foundations.  First, a PRI 
is considered a qualifying distribution for 
purposes of meeting the private foundation’s 
minimum payout requirement to avoid the excise 
tax on failure to distribute income.  See I.R.C. § 
4942.  Second., a PRI is not subject to the excise 
tax on jeopardizing investments applicable to 
private foundations.  See I.R.C. § 4944.  The IRS 
recently issued proposed regulations on PRIs 
which contain new examples of permissible 
PRIs, including investment in social enterprise.  
See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-3, example 11 
and example 12. 
211 See Reiser, supra note 207 at 623. 
 -31- 
TEXAS TAX LAWYER – SPRING 2014 
benefit corporation.212  A benefit corporation 
begins with the traditional state law 
corporate form and makes modifications to 
accomplish the following distinguishing 
characteristics of a benefit corporation: (i) a 
corporate purpose to create a material 
positive impact on society and the 
environment; (ii) expansion of the fiduciary 
duties of directors to require consideration 
of non-financial stakeholders as well as the 
financial interests of its shareholders; and 
(iii) an obligation to report on its overall 
social and environmental performance using 
a comprehensive, credible, independent and 
transparent third-party standard.213 
 In contrast to the legislatively-
approved L3C and benefit corporation, the B 
Corporation is a business form used for 
social enterprises which is self-imposed and 
privately regulated.214  A B Corporation 
(also called a “for-benefit” corporation) uses 
the existing state-law corporate form and 
incorporates into its governing documents a 
commitment to “uses the power of business 
to solve social and environmental 
problems.”215  B Lab, a private, nonprofit 
organization reviews the company’s 
structure and operations as part of its 
certification process, and if the company is 
certified by B Lab, the company may license 
the “certified B Corporation” trademark 
                                                 
212 Legislation authorizing the benefit 
corporation form has been enacted in 9 states:  
California, Hawaii, Maryland, Louisiana, New 
Jersey, New York, South Carolina, Vermont, and 
Virginia.  See Benefit Corp Information Center, 
State by State Legislative Status at 
http://www.benefitcorp.net/state-by-state-
legislative-status for links to the legislation in 
those states adopting the benefit corporation 
form. 
213  William H. Clark, Jr. & Larry Vranka, The 
Need and Rationale for the Benefit Corporation:  
Why it is the Legal Form That Best Addresses 
the Needs of Social Entrepreneurs, Investors, 
and, Ultimately, the Public (Jan. 26, 2012), at 15, 
at http://www.benefitcorp.net/for-
attorneys/benefit-corp-white-paper. 
214  Reiser, supra note 207 at 637. 
215 B Lab, What is a B Corp? at 
http://www.bcorporation.net/about. 
from B Lab.216  Often, benefit corporations 
are referred to as “B Corporations;” 
however, the benefit corporation is a 
legislatively-approved business form while 
the B Corporation is privately regulated. 
 
A. UBIT Treatment for a Charity 
Investing in a Social Enterprise.  When a 
charity invests in a social enterprise, the 
potential UBIT treatment of the investment 
to the charity will depend on the form of the 
investment.  For example, if the investment 
is structured as a loan from the charity to the 
social enterprise, then the interest that the 
charity receives on the loan generally will be 
excluded from the charity’s unrelated 
business income as passive interest 
income.217  Similarly, if the social enterprise 
is formed as a corporation,218 such as a 
benefit corporation or a B Corporation, and 
the charity’s investment in the social 
enterprise is structured as the acquisition of 
shares of stock in the social enterprise, then 
the dividend distributions the charity 
receives from the corporation generally will 
be excluded from the charity’s unrelated 
business income as passive dividend 
income.219  These interest and dividend 
exclusions may not apply, however, to the 
extent the interest or dividend income is 
treated as unrelated debt-financed income.220 
 L3Cs generally are treated as a 
partnership for federal income tax 
purposes.221  Accordingly, the L3C does not 
pay income tax on its net earnings.  Rather, 
the profits and losses of the L3C are 
                                                 
216  See B Lab, Why Become a B Corp? at 
http://www.bcorporation.net/become-a-b-Corp. 
217 See I.R.C. § 512(b)(1); but see I.R.C. § 
512(b)(13)(A)for an exception for certain interest 
payments received from a controlled subsidiary. 
218 The result is different if the corporation is 
treated as an S corporation for federal income tax 
purposes.  All income distributable to a 
charitable S corporation shareholder is treated as 
unrelated business taxable income from an asset 
deemed in its entirety to be an interest in 
unrelated trade or business.  I.R.C. § 512(e). 
219 See I.R.C. § 512(b)(1). 
220 See generally I.R.C. § 514. 
221 See Reiser, supra note 207 at 623-24. 
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allocated to its members, each of whom 
report and pay tax on the allocated profits 
and losses in accordance with such 
member’s own tax status.222  For example, if 
a charity invests in a social enterprise that is 
formed as a L3C, the charity would be 
required to report its allocated items of 
profit and loss from the L3C on the charity’s 
Form 990.   
 To the extent the reported items of 
income do not qualify for the passive 
exclusions from the unrelated business 
income tax (e.g., interest, dividends, rents, 
and capital gains),223 then the charity 
typically must apply the general three-prong 
test to determine whether the income from 
the business operated by the L3C is 
unrelated business income for the charity.224  
Usually, investment in the L3C will easily 
meet the first two prongs:  the activity 
conducted by the L3C typically is a trade or 
business and normally the activity is 
regularly carried on.  Thus, the key 
determinant is whether the activity 
conducted by the L3C substantially furthers 
the charitable purposes for which the 
charitable investor was granted tax-
exemption.  This is a case by case 
determination.  Thus, even though a L3C 
may operate to substantially further a 
charitable purpose, if the L3C’s charitable 
purpose is unrelated to the charitable 
investor’s tax-exempt purpose, then the 
income allocated to the charitable investor 
from the L3C may not be exempt from that 
charity’s UBTI.225  Accordingly, a charity 
desiring to invest in a social enterprise that 
is treated as a partnership for tax purposes 
must be careful to select a social enterprise 
that conducts activities which are closely 
aligned with the charity’s own mission. 
                                                 
222 See id. at 624. 
223 See I.R.C. § 512(b).  If the L3C derives the 
passive income from debt-financed property, 
then such income may be included in the 
charitable investor’s unrelated business income 
as debt-financed income.  See Part IV.E. of this 
outline. 
224 See I.R.C. § 513; see also Part IV.A. of this 
outline. 
225 See Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d). 
 
B. Effect of Joint Venture Rules on a 
Charity’s Investment in Social Enterprise.  
Because a social enterprise generally 
includes for-profit parties as owners, a 
charity must be mindful of the IRS’s stance 
on joint ventures between charities and for-
profit parties when deciding to invest in a 
social enterprise.  In particular, if the 
investment is a significant activity of the 
charity, the charity must be careful to 
structure its investment in the social 
enterprise so as to not jeopardize the 
charity’s tax-exempt status.  The case law 
and IRS rulings on joint ventures between 
charities and for-profit parties focus on the 
charity’s ability to ensure that the joint 
venture is operated to further charitable 
purposes.226  As applied to social 
enterprises, it is not clear how these rulings 
would impact the amount of control that a 
charitable investor should maintain over the 
operations of the social enterprise.  In 
particular, the nature of a social enterprise 
dictates that the social enterprise already 
elevates the accomplishment of charitable 
purposes over the maximization of profits 
for its owners.  This is especially true in the 
case of the L3C which is required to operate 
significantly to accomplish charitable or 
educational purposes and not significantly 
for income production or capital 
appreciation.227  Accordingly, it may not be 
as important for a charitable investor in a 
joint venture formed as a L3C to ensure that 
the social enterprise is operated to further 
charitable purposes as it is when the joint 
venture is formed using traditional business 
models.  However, whether the IRS and the 
courts will adopt this view is uncertain. 
                                                 
226 See e.g., St. David’s Health Care System v. 
United States, 349 F.3d 232 (5th Cir. 2003); 
Redlands Surgical Services v. Comm’r, 113 T.C. 
47 (1999), aff’d, 242 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001); 
Rev. Rul. 2004-51, 2004-1 C.B. 974.; Rev. Rul. 
98-15, 1998-1 C.B. 17; see also Part III. of this 
outline. 
227 See Reiser, supra note 207 at 622. 
